Demutualization and enforcement incentives at self-regulatory financial exchanges by Reiffen, David & Robe, Michel
 
 
 
 
 
Center for Financial Studies 
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt   House of Finance 
Grüneburgplatz 1   60323 Frankfurt  Deutschland 
 
 
No. 2008/44 
Demutualization and Enforcement Incentives 
at Self-regulatory Financial Exchanges 
 
David Reiffen and Michel Robe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Telefon: +49 (0)69 798-30050  
Fax: +49 (0)69 798-30077 
http://www.ifk-cfs.de  E-Mail: info@ifk-cfs.de 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Center for Financial Studies 
House of Finance  Goethe-Universität 
Grüneburgplatz 1  60323 Frankfurt am Main  Deutschland 
Center for Financial Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Center for Financial Studies is a nonprofit research organization, supported by an 
association of more than 120 banks, insurance companies, industrial corporations and 
public institutions. Established in 1968 and closely affiliated with the University of 
Frankfurt, it provides a strong link between the financial community and academia. 
The CFS Working Paper Series presents the result of scientific research on selected 
topics in the field of money, banking and finance. The authors were either participants 
in the Center´s Research Fellow Program or members of one of the Center´s Research 
Projects. 
If you would like to know more about the Center for Financial Studies, please let us 
know of your interest. 
 
    
Prof. Dr. Jan Pieter Krahnen  Prof. Volker Wieland, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Telefon: +49 (0)69 798-30050  
Fax: +49 (0)69 798-30077 
http://www.ifk-cfs.de  E-Mail: info@ifk-cfs.de 
  *  We are grateful to Jiro Kondo for helpful discussions and suggestions. We also thank Jennifer Elliott, Jo Grammig, Robert Hauswald, 
Jim Moser, Mike Penick, Ria Steiger, and participants to seminars at the SEC, the CFTC, the IMF, American University, the 2008 
Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association at Columbia University, the 2007 Meeting of the European Finance 
Association in Ljubljana, the 2007 Conference on Institutional Foundations for Industry Self-Regulation at Harvard University, the 2006 
Meeting of the European Association for Law and Economics in Madrid, and the First RS-DeGroote Conference on Market Structure and 
Integrity in Toronto, for useful comments. This paper reflects the opinions of its authors only, and not those of the CFTC, the 
Commissioners, or any of the authors’ colleagues upon the Commission staff. All errors and omissions, if any, are the authors’ sole 
responsibility. 
 
1  Corresponding author: U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 1155 21st Street, NW, Washington, DC 20581; E-mail: 
dreiffen@cftc.gov; Telephone: (+1) 202-418-5602. 
 
2  U.S. CFTC and Kogod School of Business, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20816-8044, USA; 
E-mail: mrobe@american.edu 
 
CFS Working Paper No. 2008/44 
 
Demutualization and Enforcement Incentives 
 at Self-regulatory Financial Exchanges* 
 
 
David Reiffen
1 and Michel Robe
2
 
 
 
 
May 18, 2008 
 
 
Abstract: 
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protect investors from dishonest agents. We examine how the incentives to enforce such 
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 “[T]he profit motive of a shareholder-owned SRO (self-regulatory organization) 
could detract from proper self-regulation.  For instance, shareholder-owned SROs 
may commit insufficient funds to regulatory operations.”   
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Concept Release, Fall 2004
“(W)hen operated by a management team whose main goal is to create a profit, an 
exchange may have less interest in devoting resources to its regulatory functions.”   
IMF Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook, 2005
“Might a for-profit, publicly-traded SRO attempt to attract volume or increase its 
profits through lax self-regulation?”
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2005 Request for Comments 
I. Introduction
  Following the example of the Stockholm Stock Exchange in the early 1990’s, most of the 
world’s major financial exchanges have converted from mutual, not-for-profit organizations to 
publicly-traded, for-profit firms.  Since 2000, institutions such as the Deutsche Börse, the 
London, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Toronto Stock Exchanges, and the Sydney Futures Exchange 
have demutualized.  In the United States, the two largest stock markets (the New York Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ) and the three main futures exchanges – the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME), the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), and the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX) – have all adopted the for-profit form.
1
  In most cases, the mutual exchanges had substantial self-regulatory (SR) authority.   
Significantly for investors (i.e., for the customers whose trades are executed on exchanges), these 
exchanges had legal authority to establish and enforce a variety of rules governing the behavior 
of economic agents interacting at the exchanges. While some of the newly demutualized entities 
have established independent subsidiaries for regulatory operations or even completely 
outsourced them,
2 many for-profit exchanges have retained these self-regulatory responsibilities.
  As the pace of demutualization has accelerated, concerns have grown that for-profit 
exchanges might neglect their self-regulatory responsibilities.  In particular, because enforcement 
activities are costly, “self-enforcement” could become “too little enforcement” if demutualized 
exchanges commit insufficient resources to regulatory operations in a bid to maximize profits.  
1 The CBOT and CME merged in July 2007, several years after each had demutualized and gone public.  In March 
2008, the NYMEX announced that it had agreed to be acquired by the CME.   
2 For example, NASD Regulation oversees and regulates all trading on NASDAQ and in the over-the-counter (OTC) 
markets, as well as trades in New York Stock Exchange- and Amex-listed securities reported to NASDAQ.  Late in 
2003, the National Futures Association entered into a “regulatory services agreement” with Eurex US to provide 
market surveillance and trade practice surveillance services.   2
Even if an exchange contracts out these duties to a subsidiary or third party, the same basic fear 
remains that the exchange may have incentives to under-fund the enforcement activities of the 
contracted party.  This concern is articulated in documents released by agencies such as the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO).  It is also found in statements of many academic commentators on the 
effects of demutualization (e.g., Karmel, 2002; Macey and O’Hara, 2005).
  In this paper, we examine the relationship between self-regulation and SRO ownership 
structure. Precisely, we look at the enforcement of “trade practice regulations,” i.e., of the rules 
governing how the end-investors’ agents (stock specialists, dealers, futures commission 
merchants, etc.) carry out their customers’ trades.   
  We start from the observation that market surveillance and enforcement activities exist 
because investors’ agents have incentives to misbehave.  If investors are aware of these 
incentives, they will need reassurance that the exchanges where their trades are carried out 
adequately monitor agents and enforce penalties for wrongdoing.  Hence, an exchange that cuts 
surveillance and enforcement expenditures runs the risk that investors will decline to trade on 
that exchange.  In other words, cost-cutting could itself be costly.
  To capture these features, we analyze whether for-profit exchanges have greater or lesser 
incentives to enforce trade practice regulations in the context of a model in which agents have 
better information than do their customers about the outcomes of trades.  Agents can exploit that 
information to their advantage.  The exchange can investigate suspected misrepresentations and 
mete out penalties to the wrongdoers it identifies, but such monitoring is costly.  This type of 
costly state verification model (CSV) has been used to evaluate principal-agent problems in the 
contexts of debt contracts,
3 various agency relationships, and in self-regulatory organizations 
(DeMarzo, Fishman & Hagerty, 2005 – hereafter, DFH).  We extend this prior work in several 
ways.  First, we model SRO decision-making under alternative ownership structures, which 
allows us to assess how enforcement policies differ across ownership structures.  Second, we 
consider the effects of agent wealth and, more importantly, agent heterogeneity.  This extension, 
which captures the reality that exchange members differ, allows us to model cases in which some 
agents commit trade practice violations in equilibrium.  Finally, we analyze the interaction of 
3 See, e.g., Townsend (1979), Gale & Hellwig (1985), Boyd & Smith (1994), and references cited therein.   3
these effects – i.e., to the extent that violations take place, whether their frequency differs across 
ownership structures.
  Our principal finding is that, contrary to oft-expressed fears, for-profit SROs have greater 
incentives to enforce trade practice rules than do mutual SROs.  Intuitively, the goal of a mutual 
SRO is to maximize agent (i.e., member) income, and so it adopts an enforcement policy that 
creates positive incentives for agents to report honestly (carrots).  By contrast, a for-profit SRO 
is less interested in agent income, and as a result it relies to a greater extent on punishment for 
dishonesty (sticks) in the form of a greater likelihood of investigating agents to insure honest 
reporting.  Our conclusion that demutualization need not lead to laxer enforcement of customer 
protection rules complements theoretical demonstrations that, also contrary to widespread 
concerns, futures exchange competition need not lead to a “race to the bottom” with respect to 
margin requirements (Santos and Scheinkman, 2001) and, similarly, that merging stock 
exchanges need not always adopt “lowest common denominator” standards for listing companies 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2006).
  Our model generates additional implications for the enforcement of trade practice rules.  
We show that greater agent wealth allows SROs (whether mutual or for-profit) to reduce the 
frequency of investigations without inducing misreporting.  What is more important, in the 
extension of the model in which agents are heterogeneous, we show that, ceteris paribus, an 
equilibrium in which some misreporting is tolerated is more likely when the SRO is a mutual 
exchange.  This result suggests an additional dimension in which demutualization might lead to a 
more, rather than less, rigorous trading environment.   
  Two qualifications to our results are worth noting.  First, our results imply that 
demutualized exchanges should earn lower aggregate profit than mutual exchanges, since 
increased enforcement expenditures reduce profits (holding the number of violations fixed).   
Therefore, it must be that the decision to demutualize in the first place is the result of economic 
considerations that are unrelated to the enforcement of trade practice rules.  Indeed, previous 
literature suggests that the recent demutualization wave can be rationalized as a means of 
responding to structural market changes when exchange members differ in their objectives or in 
their abilities to adapt to these changes (e.g., Hart and Moore, 1996; Pirrong, 2000; Steil, 2002).  
In other words, our analysis implicitly assumes that the increased cost of enforcing trade practice 4
rules are small compared to other gains from demutualization (so that demutualization is ex-ante
profitable, even when the higher enforcement costs are rationally anticipated).
4
  Second, trade practice rules are only one aspect of the rules enforced by self-regulatory 
exchanges.  Other kinds of regulations include standards for listing companies; rules meant to 
ensure the integrity of market prices, such as bans on insider trading and price manipulations; 
and statutes designed to guard the financial integrity of the exchange or clearing house, such as 
margin rules and member net-worth requirements. Nevertheless, a significant portion of 
enforcement activities at many financial exchanges stems from regulations related to the 
behavior of exchange members with respect to their customers, such as rules against front-
running, wash trading, and bucketing.  This is particularly true of U.S. futures exchanges, which 
have no analogue to the listing requirements or insider trading statutes that apply to U.S. (and 
many international) securities exchanges.  To be sure, rules such as bans on price manipulation 
and member net-worth requirements do apply to these futures exchanges. As an empirical matter, 
however, trade practice violations have generated the majority of enforcement cases at U.S. 
futures exchanges over the past decade.
5  Thus, our focus on trade practice rules reflects a key 
aspect of self-regulatory activity at some of the world’s largest financial exchanges.
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II summarizes our contribution 
to the literature.  Section III outlines our stylized model of self-regulating organizations (SROs).  
Section IV characterizes the optimal strategies for customers, agents and the SRO, when all 
agents are homogenous.  Section V introduces agent heterogeneity.  Section VI considers two 
other extensions of the basic model, including relaxing liability limits.  Section VII concludes.   
II.  Related Work
  Our paper is part of a sizeable body of research on organizational ownership structure.  
More specifically, it contributes to the literature that focuses on the causes and effects of the 
choice between the open-stock and mutual forms of organization by financial institutions such as 
4 To wit, Hasan et al. (2003) provide evidence that demutualized exchanges use resources more efficiently.  The 
resulting savings could offset the losses due to higher enforcement costs arising from demutualization.  
5 Price manipulation cases at U.S. futures exchanges have typically been handled by the government rather than by 
these exchanges, which may reflect the government’s greater ability to handle such cases.   5
thrifts, insurance companies, or exchanges. Some of that work is theoretical;
6 much is empirical.
7
  Because financial exchanges play a major role in market economies, the demutualization 
trend has generated a substantial amount of discussion in law reviews
8 as well as in policy 
circles.
9  In the present paper, we provide the first formal model of the implications of financial 
exchange demutualization on enforcement activities.  We show that maximizing the income of 
an exchange’s shareholders need not conflict with – in fact, depends on – the exchange’s 
vigorously enforcing trade practice rules.
Our endeavor is also related to the (theoretical) economics literature that analyzes the 
organizational choices of financial exchanges, as well as to the (empirical) finance literature that 
assesses the consequences of exchange demutualization.   
  On the theoretical side, Hart and Moore (1996, 1998) and Pirrong (2000) analyze an 
exchange’s choice between for-profit stock ownership and mutual organization.  In these models, 
trader heterogeneity in terms of size (Hart and Moore) or efficiency (Pirrong) is the main driver 
of ownership structure choice.
10  Unlike those papers, our focus is not on a financial exchange’s 
decision to demutualize in the first place.  Rather, we take a self-regulatory exchange’s decision 
to demutualize as a given, and then investigate the impact of the resulting separation between 
trading rights and ownership rights on enforcement incentives.   
6 Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b, 1985) provide general analyses of organizational choice with specific discussions 
of financial mutuals. In the case of insurance companies, see e.g. Mayers and Smith (1981, 1988); Smith and Stutzer 
(1990a, 1995); Doherty (1991); Doherty and Dionne (1993); and Ligon and Thistle (2005).  There is relatively less 
work on organizational choices by thrifts (Esty, 1997a) or mutual financing companies (Smith and Stutzer, 1990b).   
7 A number of empirical studies look at the reasons for (de)mutualization at thrifts (Masulis, 1987; Mester, 1991) 
and at insurance firms (Fitzgerald, 1973; Mayers and Smith, 1986, 1994, 2005; Viswanathan and Cummins, 2003; 
Viswanathan, 2006).  Studies of the aftermath of demutualization by insurance companies show that it leads to better 
product-market and financial performance (McNamara and Rhee, 1992) but also greater risk-taking (Lamm-Tennant 
and Starks, 1993) and increased reliance on trials rather than settlements to manage customer claims (Kerr, 2005).  
In the case of thrifts, demutualization improves financial performance (Cole and Mehran, 1998) but also leads to 
greater risk-taking (Cordell, MacDonald and Wohar, 1993; Esty, 1997a, 1997b).   
8 See, e.g., Karmel (2002) and Fleckner (2006) on demutualization, and Mahoney (1997) and Macey and O’Hara 
(2005) on the respective roles of government and SROs amidst changes in exchanges’ competitive environment.   
9 For regulatory and economic policy papers on the issues raised by demutualization and other structural changes in 
the environment in which exchanges operate, see e.g. Elliott (2002); Claessens, Lee and Zechner (2003); Lee 
(2003); Carson (2003); Chaddad and Cook (2004); and, references cited therein.  See also SEC (2004), CFTC 
(2005), IMF (2005), and IOSCO (2006).  For an international perspective, see Akhtar (2002).   
10 See Steil (2002, pp. 68-70) for a comparison of these two models and a discussion of the relevant issues.  We are 
aware of only two other theoretical papers on exchange structure choice.  Pirrong (1999) presents a theory of the 
organization of financial exchange markets that rationalizes the choice of mutual structure as a means for exchange 
members to earn rents, and then tests his model’s predictions about the resulting equilibrium market structure.  That 
paper, however, does not analyze the issue of exchange demutualization.  In a recent working paper on the causes of 
demutualization, Serifsoy and Tyrell (2006) build a dynamic model of the impact of competition between exchanges 
on the fragility of mutual vs. stock forms of ownership.   6
  On the empirical side, several recent studies analyze the consequences of exchange 
demutualization.  Using trading data for 40 stocks listed on two Indian exchanges in the 1990s, 
Krishnamurti, Sequeira & Fangjian (2003) conclude that demutualization lowers transactions 
costs.  Treptow (2006) analyzes the effect of demutualization on trading volume and spreads.  
Using data for 156 stocks that were dual listed on the New York Stock Exchange and 12 non-
U.S. exchanges, that author studies whether the market share of a home exchange rises (relative 
to the NYSE’s share of the total trading volume) after that exchange demutualizes.  He finds 
evidence that demutualization brings about higher volume, as well as lower bid-ask spreads.  In a 
similar vein, we focus on an outcome of demutualization that matters for the investors who trade 
on the exchange.
11  Rather than an empirical study of market liquidity or spreads, however, we 
carry out a theoretical analysis of the implications of ownership structure for the vigor with 
which the exchange will enforce customer protection rules.   
III.  A Model of Self-Regulation in Financial Markets
  Our goal is to model the decisions of agents in financial markets regarding whether to 
honestly represent the interests of their clients, and the impact of an exchange’s objectives (i.e., 
its ownership structure) on these decisions and responses.  Specifically, we consider agents who 
carry out their clients’ wishes to trade on organized exchanges.  In doing so, we model clients 
and exchanges as rationally anticipating the behavior of agents given the reward schedule.  In the 
United States and elsewhere, many of these exchanges are self-regulatory organizations, 
whereby the exchanges enforce rules about permissible trading behavior by customers’ agents.
12
  On U.S. exchanges, for instance, federal regulations prohibit a variety of trade practices 
such as “front-running,” “non-competitive trading,” “changing prices,” etc.  These regulations 
11 In case studies of demutualization by the London Stock Exchange and Borsa Italiana, Hazarika (2005) concludes 
that demutualization is associated with increased order flow but that its impact on trading costs varies depending on 
the cause of demutualization (reaction to a more competitive environment vs. government mandate). Other empirical 
studies of demutualized exchanges either compare their post-IPO financial performance with that of other firms, or 
compare demutualized stock exchanges pre- and post-IPO operating performance and value enhancement (O’Hara 
and Mendiola, 2003; Agarwal and Dahiya, 2006; Serifsoy, 2007).  As these papers point out, of course, any 
evidence of changes in performance should be seen as preliminary because demutualization is a recent phenomenon.   
12 In many countries, a government agency (such as the SEC or the CFTC in the United States) has oversight of the 
SRO’s enforcement practices, including the ability to conduct additional inspections and to potentially sanction the 
SRO for failing to enforce rules.  The potential for government intervention, which can bring about a more stringent 
enforcement policy by a mutual SRO (see DFH), does not affect our main conclusions.   7
are collectively known as “trade practice” rules.
13 The element common to the prohibited 
practices is that they allow the agent to misrepresent the best available price, to the detriment of 
the customer.  For example, front-running a trade for a client who wants to establish a long 
position can result in the customer’s paying a higher price to establish that position than if the 
customer’s trade had been made prior to the agent’s trade.
14
A. Model Overview
  We employ a stylized model of this environment to evaluate how investors respond to the 
potential for dishonest agents and how the SRO chooses an enforcement policy.  There are three 
kinds of parties in this model: investors, i.e., customers; agents, who conduct trades on behalf of 
these investors; and the exchange (SRO) on which the trading takes place.  Following DFH, we 
focus on a single exchange.  A customer does not route a trade to this exchange unless she 
expects to at least achieve an exogenous reservation utility level, D.  One could interpret D as the 
customer’s expected utility from transacting on an alternative trading platform, with greater 
competition across trading venues captured by a larger D.
  We assume that there are many agents competing for each customer’s business on the 
exchange, so that customers have all the bargaining power when contracting with agents.  In this 
environment, a customer hires an agent to carry out a trade by offering a contract that maximizes 
the customer’s surplus from trading, subject to the agent’s receiving non-negative profits.  At the 
same time, however, policies set by the exchange influence the share of the overall surplus from 
trading that each category of participant (customer, agent, exchange) can expect to earn.   
  We posit that the best price an agent can get when carrying out a customer’s trade is not 
observable by the agent’s customer.  Instead, the customer only receives the agent’s report of the 
cash-flow (net of the agent’s trading costs) generated by the trade.  We assume that the true cash-
flow W takes on one of two values: w2 with probability S2, or w1 with probability S1, where w2 > 
13 “Front-running” refers to trades made by the agent (broker or futures commission merchant) on the same side of a 
market prior to executing an order that has already been placed by a client.  “Non-competitive” or fictitious trading 
includes wash trading, bucketing, or other schemes that give an appearance of trading when no bona fide
competitive trading has occurred.  “Changing prices” refers to an agent’s misrepresenting the actual trading price. 
See, e.g., Johnson and Hazen (2004) for a detailed discussion of trade practice rules.  See also Cumming and Johan 
(2006) for an empirical investigation of surveillance activities in 25 of the world’s largest financial exchanges.   
14 For trade practice violations, the benefit to the exchange of enforcing the rules is internalized.  In contrast, the 
enforcement of other kinds of rules (e.g., anti-manipulation) can have positive externalities to rival exchanges.  
Macey and O'Hara (2005) articulate concerns about an exchange’s incentive to enforce rules benefiting its rivals. 8
w1, greater meaning that it is more advantageous for the customer.  For example, suppose that the 
customer is selling a share of stock.  Then w2 is the high realization of the price received, and w1
is the low realization.  This captures the general notion of unobservable states of the world in a 
tractable model.  To avoid trivial cases, we assume that w1 < D < w2 – i.e., the customer is 
willing to trade, but only if she expects to receive a payment above w1.
  The SRO oversees agent behavior, in the sense that it observes agents’ reports of the 
realized states, can choose to investigate (at a cost) whether a given report was accurate and, if it 
was not, the size of the fine X to impose on the reporting agent.  We assume that agents have 
limited liability so that the fine cannot exceed an agent's resources, i.e., the sum of the ill-gotten 
gains plus the agent's pre-trade wealth, J.
15  Any fine thus levied on an agent is paid to that 
agent’s injured customer.   
B. Timing
Figure 1: Sequence of Events 
  Figure 1 depicts the sequence of events in the model.  The SRO first sets its enforcement 
policy {P, X } – where P stands for the probabilities pi (i=1,2) that the SRO will review a 
transaction that is reported to be in state i while X stands for the penalties xij (i,j=1,2) to be meted 
out if the agent reports state wj and the SRO determines that the true state was wi.  The customer 
15 In a dynamic environment, the SRO would also have the option of suspending the agent’s trading privileges, 
which has an effect similar to that of a fine.  The static framework adopted here captures the essence of the trade-off 
inherent in the agent’s decision of whether to honestly report the realized state. In the dynamic environment, Ȗ could 
represent the future earnings loss to a trader whose trading privileges are suspended.  
Time
Exchange chooses enforcement policy {P,X}  
Agent privately observes realized cash-flow from trading, W;
Agent chooses amount reported to customer 
Exchange investigates agent’s report with probability P and cost c
Payoffs are realized
Customer offers payment schedule Z(W) to agent
Agents caught misreporting must pay penalty X9
then chooses with which agent to trade and the terms of the contract, given {P, X}.  In this 
context, the contract consists of a schedule specifying the state-contingent transfer that the agent 
will make to the customer, Z(W) and thus the agent’s fee, W-Z(W).  Given the enforcement 
parameters and the fee schedule, the agent decides whether to accept the customer’s contract.  If 
the agent chooses to accept the contract, he then executes the transaction, chooses a report to 
make to the customer about the transaction, and makes the associated transfer to the customer, 
z(wi).  Finally, the SRO has the opportunity to examine the agent’s report and to impose the 
promised penalty in case of misreporting.   
C. The Exchange’s Objective
  The SRO sets its enforcement policy to maximize its own objective function, in 
anticipation of the behavior of customers and agents.  A key goal of our analysis is to compare 
the enforcement policy of a not-for-profit, mutual exchange with that of a for-profit, 
demutualized exchange.  To do so, we take the self-regulatory exchange’s decision to 
demutualize as a given, and then investigate the implications of that decision on the SRO’s 
optimal enforcement policy.   
  We posit, in line with DFH, that a mutual SRO seeks to maximize agent income (subject 
to customers’ expecting to receive their reservation utility D) and sets its transaction fee tNFP to 
cover its expected enforcement costs:  tNFP = (PNFP3)c , where PNFP is the mutual exchange’s 
vector of investigation probabilities, 3 is the vector of states-of-the-world probabilities, and c is 
the unit investigation cost.
  In contrast, we assume that a demutualized exchange seeks to maximize its shareholders’ 
income (trading fees net of expected investigation costs), subject to customers and agents 
expecting to receive their respective reservation utilities.  This choice of objective function:  tFP–
(PFP3)c  captures the concern that a for-profit exchange has incentives to curtail its enforcement 
expenditures.  The assumption that the exchange collects revenues by charging per-unit-trade 
fees reflects practices at the major U.S. futures exchanges.
  The next section assesses whether this fear is warranted, given that an exchange must 
optimize its objective function subject to the constraints it faces – in particular, the constraint that 
customers will not trade on that exchange unless their expected gains from trading there, which 
depend on its enforcement policies, are high enough.   10
IV. Enforcement Policies under Alternative Ownership Structures
  As noted above, we model the behavior of customers who offer fee schedules to agents 
representing them in the execution of transactions on an exchange.  What is relevant to the 
customer when choosing these fees is the exchange’s enforcement policy {P, X}, but not the 
reason why the exchange chose P and X (i.e., the exchange’s objective function).  We therefore 
first derive the contract that the customer optimally offers to the agent, taking P and X as given.  
Given the fee schedule chosen by the customer and the enforcement policy of the exchange, 
agents decide which message to send (e.g., which price to report), conditional on the exogenous 
true state.  The SRO chooses its enforcement policy {P, X} in anticipation of the behavior of 
customers and agents.  The remainder of this section derives the equilibrium of this game.   
A. The Customer’s Optimization
  As is standard in CSV models, a customer contracts with an agent to make a trade (e.g., 
sell a share of stock) and the customer cannot observe the realization of the trade.   All the agents 
are risk-neutral and otherwise identical (we relax this assumption in Section V below).  The 
customer, who takes the exchange’s enforcement policy as given, wants to set a fee schedule that 
induces the agent to tell the truth about the realized trade.  Specifically, the risk-neutral customer 
sets a schedule of fees to maximize her expected income from the trade, subject to the constraints 
that (i) the agent tells the truth (agent incentive compatibility constraint – AIC); (ii) the agent is 
better off serving the customer than not (agent individual rationality, or participation, constraint 
– AIR); (iii) the agent earn a non-negative return whenever he correctly reports the true state (no 
loss condition – NLC).
  Formally, the customer’s problem is to:
16
        Max {z(w1),z(w2)} ʌ2 z(w2) + ʌ1z(w1)   –   t             
subject to
       AIC     (1)    w2–z(w2) > p1(max{w2–z(w1) – x12, –Ȗ})  + (1–p1) (w2–z(w1))
16 Condition (3) implies that the AIR condition (2) is redundant if A0= 0, as in DFH.  We impose both constraints in 
this Section to set up the parallel with the weaker version of condition (3) that we analyze in Section V.B.  There, we 
consider optimal contracts in a more general model, in which condition (2) is not redundant even if A0 = 0.  The 
qualitative results of the present section carry through to that alternative model.   11
       AIR   (2)    ʌ1(w1–z(w1)) + ʌ2 (w2–z(w2)) > A0
       NLC    (3)    wi–z(wi) > 0; i = 1,2 
where: ʌi      is the likelihood of state i, with 1> ʌ2 = 1–ʌ1 > 0;
zi Ł z(wi)    is the customer’s return in state i (e.g., how much the customer receives 
 from the sale of a stock when the agent announces that the state is state i);  
t       is the transaction fee charged by the SRO; 
wi–z(wi)   is the agent’s fee in state i (i.e.., how much the customer pays the agent 
when the latter reports state i);
pi    is the probability that the SRO will review a transaction that is reported to 
 be in state i (i = 1,2); 
xij    is the penalty to the agent if he announces state i, but state j is the true 
 state and the SRO catches the agent misreporting;  
A0> 0     is the agent’s opportunity cost; following DFH, we set A0 = 0;
Ȗ > 0     is the agent’s pre-transaction wealth.
  Implicit in the statement of the AIC constraint is the fact that the agent has no incentive 
to misrepresent the poor outcome, w1.  Embedded in the statement of the AIR constraint is the 
result that the SRO will set penalties xij = 0 for all i, j except perhaps for x12 (i.e., when the high 
return w2 is realized but the agent pretends the low return w1 has been realized).  This penalty 
structure is optimal for both the mutual and for-profit SROs.
17  Consequently, to ensure that there 
are gains from trading for all 0 < p1< 1, we assume that ʌ1 w1+ ʌ2 w2 > D + ʌ1 c.
  The customer’s problem is similar to that in DFH, except that we allow the agent wealth 
J> 0, rather than restrict J to 0.  Figure 2 illustrates graphically three of the constraints faced by 
the customer in this environment.  The agent’s incentive-compatibility constraint (1) is depicted 
by the upward-sloping AIC line.  The line, drawn for the case where w2– z(w1) + Ȗ > x12, can be 
written as z(w2) = z(w1) + p1 x12.
18  To ensure incentive compatibility, z(w2) must lie on or below 
this line.  The agent’s individual rationality constraint (2) is depicted by the downward-sloping 
AIR line, z(w2) = w2 + ʌ1w1/ʌ2 – ʌ1z(w1)/ʌ2.  To ensure the agent’s participation, z(w2) must lie
on or below this line.  Finally, the limited liability constraint (3) is shown for i = 1 by the vertical 
17 It is straightforward to extend arguments in DFH to show that this result also holds for the mutual SRO with the 
weaker version of (3) used in Section IV.A.  As discussed below, the same result holds for the for-profit SRO.   
18 If it were optimal for the SRO to set x12 > w2– z(w1) + Ȗ, then the AIC would take the form z(w2) = (1 - p1) z(w1)
+ p1 (w2+ Ȗ).   In equilibrium, however, it does not matter whether the SRO selects x12 > w2– z(w1) + Ȗ or x12 = w2–
z(w1) + Ȗ, because the z(wi) chosen are the same in either case.  We therefore focus here on the latter case.   12
NLC line at z(w1) = w1; z(w1) must lie to the left of this line.  The shaded five-sided area depicts 
the combinations of z(w1) and z(w2) that meet all three constraints.   
  The customer’s income in Figure 2 is just the mirror image of the agent’s income, in that 
the expected aggregate income to the two parties is always Ȉʌiwi (minus the SRO fee t).  In other 
words, the customer’s iso-income lines are parallel to the agent participation constraint (AIR).  
The solid AIR line represents the maximal customer income (gross of enforcement costs) that is 
consistent with the agent-participation constraint (2).  Whether the AIR constraint is binding or 
not (i.e., whether maximized customer income falls short of this amount or not) depends on the 
parameters P, X, and Ȗ – all of which are taken as exogenous by the consumer.  In any case, the 
customer’s constrained optimization is to set z*(w1) = w1.  Setting instead z(w1) < w1 would not 
only lower the customer’s payment in state 1, but would also lower the maximum z(w2) that is 
incentive-compatible – i.e., that is consistent with (1).  Given this constraint, the highest income 
the customer can obtain is depicted by the downward sloping line going through the intersection 
of the incentive compatibility constraint (1) and the vertical NLC line representing the no-loss 
constraint (3).  At this point, constraint (2) is not binding (for A0 = 0).  Thus, as in DFH, the 
customer will set z*(w2, Ȗ) = p1x12 + w1.  Lemma 1 summarizes these results:   
Lemma 1: Given the exchange’s enforcement policy (i.e., given investigation likelihood p1 and 
penalty for wrongdoing x12), the customer sets z*(w1) = w1and z*(w2) = p1x12 + w1.
B. The Mutual SRO’s Optimization 
  Given this behavior by the customer, a mutual SRO (MSRO) seeks to maximize agent 
income using the pi'’s and xij’s as instruments, subject to the constraint that customers expect to 
earn their reservation levels of income (customer individual rationality – CIR).
  Formally, the MSRO’s problem (MP) is to maximize  
ʌ2 (w2–z(w2)) + ʌ1(w1–z(w1) )         ( M P )  
with respect to the enforcement parameters (the xij’s and pi’s) subject to the agent’s truth-telling 
and no-loss constraints, (1) and (3), and to the customer’s expecting an income of at least Į:
     CIR   (4)    ʌ2 z(w2) + ʌ1 z(w1) – t > Į    13
where, t is the fee that the exchange charges customers per transaction.  Reflecting the non-profit 
nature of an MSRO, we assume that t is set equal to the expected number of inspections, ʌ1 p1,
times the unit investigation cost, c.
  As discussed above, the customer’s choice of Z(W) reflects constraints (1) through (3).  
Furthermore,  t = ʌ1p1 c.  Thus, we can replace the above constraints with the single constraint:  
     CIR’      (4’)    ʌ2 z*(w2) + ʌ1 z*(w1) – ʌ1 p1 c > Į
where z*(wi, Ȗ) reflects the optimized value of z(wi) subject to constraints (1) through (3).
  We have assumed, following DFH, that Į > w1.
19  It is worth noting that this assumption 
imposes bounds on how large the investigation cost c can be.  Specifically, the customer receives 
ʌ2 z(w2) + ʌ1 z(w1) – t = p1 ʌ2 (w2 – w1 + Ȗ) + w1 – ʌ1 p1 c, which must be greater than Į for the 
CIR to hold.  Given Į > w1, no solution exists unless c < (w2 – w1 + Ȗ )ʌ2/ʌ1.
20
  Lemma 2 derives the MSRO’s optimal enforcement parameters.  
Lemma 2: The mutual SRO sets 
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; p2 = 0; x12 = w2 - w1 + Ȗ ; 
and, xij = 0 for all other i,j.
Proof:  See Appendix.
  Intuitively, Lemma 2 shows that the MSRO creates an enforcement environment – via
positive fines for misreporting (which are paid to the customer) and a positive probability of 
detection – such that customers choose to give their agents some incentive for honesty.  This 
SRO policy maximizes agent income, subject to the constraint that customers expect an income 
of Į.  For any given expected fine (i.e., for any p1x12), it is optimal for the MSRO to set x12 as 
high as possible (i.e., set x12 = w2–w1 + Ȗ) because the concomitant decrease in the probability of 
investigation, p1, reduces enforcement expenditures – which, in turn, allows for higher agent fees 
in equilibrium.  Lemma 2 thus also implies that PM/Ȗ < 0; that is, higher agent wealth allows 
the exchange to select higher penalties, which allows it to reduce p1 while holding p1x12  fixed.
                                                
19 In the trivial case where Į < w1, it is optimal for the SRO to set p1 = 0 – in which case the agent always reports 
that state 1 has occurred and the customer receives w1, regardless of which state actually occurred.   
20 This result strengthens the conclusion in Proposition 2 of DFH.  These authors find that, when J= 0, an investor-
income maximizing SRO would either set p1 = 0 or p1 = 1 depending on the sign of c – (w2 – w1)ʌ2/ʌ1.  The analysis 
here implies that an SRO seeking to maximize customer surplus would set p1 = 1 when J= 0.14
  The condition that ʌ2 (w2–w1+ Ȗ) – ʌ1 c > Į – w1 in Lemma 2 (which is implicit in DFH, 
for Ȗ = 0, and hence holds for all Ȗ < Į –w1) requires that there be some p1 that allows the MSRO 
to provide an enforcement regime in which customers can earn an income of at least Į.  The 
interpretation of this inequality is that Į –w1 would be the customer’s loss in income from trading 
if p1 were equal to 0 (recalling that z*(w2) = z*(w1) = w1 if p1 = 0).  The left-hand side, ʌ2 (w2 –
w1+ Ȗ) – ʌ1 c, is the gain in customer income from a unit increase in p1.  Thus, if ʌ2 (w2– w1+ Ȗ)
– ʌ1 c<Į – w1, increases in p1 are insufficient to make up for the entire income loss.   
  Figure 3 shows how changing the investigation probability p1 affects the customer’s 
expected income.  At p1 = p’, the customer can only reach the income level C1.  If C1 < Į, then 
condition (4) is not satisfied.  In order to meet the customer’s participation constraint, the MSRO 
needs to increase p1 to a level, say p’’, that enables customers to reach income level C0 = Į.
  Figure 4 shows the relation between the customer’s expected income and the exogenous 
agent wealth, Ȗ.  As Ȗ rises (for a fixed w1), the customer can move to higher income, from C0 to 
C2.  If p1 were held constant at p’’, this move would reduce agent income.  The MSRO therefore 
lowers p1 (to p’) as Ȗ increases, so that px is kept constant and the customer’s expected income 
remains equal to Į.  The agent’s income correspondingly rises.  Furthermore, because combined 
net income (i.e., agent income plus customer income minus enforcement costs) rises as p1 falls, 
the agent and thus the MSRO are strictly better off with higher Ȗ.
C. The Profit-maximizing SRO’s Optimization 
  The analysis of a mutual exchange in Section IV.B is similar to DFH, save for the minor 
generalization that the agent’s wealth Ȗ can be strictly positive.  In this Section, we characterize 
the optimal enforcement policy of a demutualized, profit-maximizing exchange (PSRO) that 
earns its revenues through the transaction fee, t.  Given risk-neutrality, the PSRO’s problem is to 
Max {t, P, X}  t – 3 P c
subject to the same all-in-one customer individual rationality constraint (4’).
 Again,  Z*(W) takes into account constraints (1) to (3).  As shown above, z*(w1) = w1 and 
z*(w2) = w1+p1x12.  The CIR’ constraint must bind as well, otherwise t could be increased 
(thereby raising the PSRO’s objective) without inducing customers or agents to exit.  Hence:   15
Lemma 3:  The for-profit SRO sets 
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; p2 = 0; x12 = w2–w1 + Ȗ;
xij = 0 for all other i,j; and,  t = w1 + ʌ2 (w2–w1) – Į.
Proof:  See Appendix.
  Intuitively, the PSRO chooses values for the enforcement parameters, P and X, and the 
transaction fee, t, so that both agents and customers only receive their reservation values.
  The PSRO sets the penalty x12 as high as it can given agent-liability limits (i.e., x=  w 2–
w1 + Ȗ), as otherwise x12 could be increased and p1 reduced, which would lower SRO costs.  It 
then chooses p1 so that, when customers optimally choose z(w2) and z(w1), an agent’s expected 
income is 0 (these choices of p1 and x12 lead to z*(wi) = wi, i = 1,2).
  As was the case for the MSRO, PF/Ȗ < 0.  The intuition for PF/Ȗ < 0 is similar to that 
for the MSRO: higher agent wealth increases the maximum penalty that can be levied on the 
agent, which allows the PSRO to satisfy the AIC with a smaller investigation probability p 1.
Note that, when Ȗ = 0, PF = 1: because the agent’s payment is 0 in both states, the agent would 
have no incentive to honestly report for any p < 1.
  Lemma 3 implies that the fee t is independent of Ȗ in equilibrium. Still, because the PSRO 
spends less on enforcement to obtain the same t as Ȗ increases, its profits rise with Ȗ.  Hence, like 
the MSRO, the PSRO prefers agents to have higher wealth.
  Figure 5 illustrates the PSRO’s decision.  C0 is the income level associated with the 
customer’s participation constraint (4).  A0 is the income level associated with the agent’s 
participation constraint (2).  As before, the AIC line z*(w2) = z*(w1) + p1 (w2 – w1+ Ȗ) represents 
the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (1), and the vertical NLC line at w1 reflects the no-
loss constraint (3) in state 1.  Figure 5 shows that, if the exchange sets p1 = p’ < PF, then agent’s 
expected income would be A1 > A0, and t would equal A1 – C0, the value that maximizes 
exchange profits when p1 = p’.  By increasing p1 towards PF, the exchange makes the agent’s 
income falls towards his reservation level A0, and t can be increased without violating condition 
(4).  In equilibrium, the fee t is the vertical distance between A0 and C0, achieved when p1 = PF.
As Ȗ increases, x12 rises so that the AIR shifts upward, and the value of PF that leads to the agent 
income level A0 falls; however, because the distance between A0and C0 is independent of Ȗ (both 
lines have the same slope: ʌ2/ʌ1), the PSRO fee t remains unaffected.   16
  In sum, the for-profit exchange uses p1 and t to extract surplus from both customer and 
agent.  By increasing p1, the exchange reduces the agent’s surplus.  Were t set equal to ʌ1 pc (as 
was the case for mutual SROs), the customer would thus attain higher levels of expected income.  
Consequently, the for-profit SRO sets t > ʌ1 pc to extract those rents from the customer.   
D. Comparison of Ownership Structures 
  The principal conclusion that follows from the foregoing analysis is that the PSRO 
devotes more resources to enforcement than does the MSRO.  Formally, we have:  
Proposition 1:   The for-profit SRO spends at least as much on enforcement as does the mutual SRO.   
Proof:  See Appendix.
  The logic behind Proposition 1 is that, because the agent’s compensation equals E[W] – 
D – ʌ1tPM under the mutual form, there would be no revenue for the owners of the for-profit SRO 
if agent compensation were not lower with a for-profit SRO.  With either a for-profit or a mutual 
SRO, rents are earned by agents only if state 2 occurs.  Hence, it follows that a for-profit SRO 
must reduce agent compensation in the high state (state 2) and, thus, the difference between the 
agent’s state-1 income and state-2 income must be lower at a for-profit SRO.  This, in turn, 
implies that PF  must be higher than PM in order to induce honest reporting.
  An implication of Proposition 1 is that PSROs are generally more willing than are MSRO 
to invest in technology that reduces the per-unit cost of enforcement, c.  For example, suppose 
there was an innovation that lowers the cost per inspection by ǻc but requires an up-front outlay 
of F.  If ǻc is sufficiently large, then it is straightforward to show that the PRSO will be willing 
to pay more to acquire this new technology.  The intuition follows directly from Proposition 1: 
for any given c, the PRSO carries out more inspections than does the MSRO and, hence, its total 
cost savings from lowering the per-inspection cost c are higher.
V. Agent Heterogeneity
  In Section IV, customers as well as agents are assumed homogeneous in all respects.  
While this simplifying assumption puts the emphasis on the intuition behind our main results, it 
abstracts from the differences across customers and agents that characterize financial markets.   17
  To evaluate the impact of customer heterogeneity, DFH introduce differences in 
investors’ alternatives to trading on an exchange by allowing customers to have different 
reservation utilities (D).  Such an extension of the basic model could be incorporated into our 
analysis.  In that case, changes in the probability of investigation p would have welfare effects.
  For the present analysis, we focus instead on differences among customers’ agents.   
Precisely, we examine the impact of cross-agent differences in wealth or future profitability 
(captured by variations in J) on self-regulation at mutual versus demutualized exchanges.   
  There are several reasons why allowing for agent heterogeneity is especially relevant in 
the context of our paper.  First, previous research suggests that it is a major reason why 
exchanges have traditionally used the mutual, not-for-profit form of organization (e.g., Hart and 
Moore, 1996, 1998; Pirrong, 2000).  In a related vein, there is evidence that the recent wave of 
exchange demutualizations may be an optimal response to technological change in the presence 
of agent heterogeneity (e.g., Karmel, 2002; Aggarwal and Dahiya, 2006).  It is therefore sensible 
to confirm the robustness of our main results when agents are heterogeneous.  Second, there have 
been several hundred trade-practice violation cases on U.S. futures exchanges alone in the past 
decade.  By showing that agent heterogeneity may lead an SRO to let some agents misreport in 
equilibrium, our analysis helps capture an important aspect of economic behavior at financial 
exchanges.  Furthermore, to the extent that the propensity to allow misreporting varies across 
ownership structures, this extension yields another lens through which we can assess the impact 
of demutualization on the rigor of exchanges’ enforcement activities.   

A. Modeling Agent Heterogeneity 
  The previous section showed that, when agents are homogeneous, customer welfare is the 
same with mutual and for-profit exchanges.  Under either form of exchange ownership, 
customers only receive their reservation values from trading, and there is no misreporting in 
equilibrium.  In this Section, we present a highly stylized extension of the basic model in which 
agent heterogeneity can result in misreporting.  We then compare the equilibrium amounts of 
misreporting at mutual versus for-profit SROs.   
  In practice, a key source of heterogeneity across agents is their wealth (or, alternatively, 
their productivity). To capture this fact, we let agents differ with respect to the exogenous wealth 
parameter, J in a way that is not readily observable by customers prior to deciding which agent 18
to hire.  This assumption is equivalent to positing that agents’ compensation schedules cannot be 
conditioned on wealth.  In the context of the financial intermediaries we analyze, customer’s 
uncertainty about agent wealth could result from agents’ owning portfolios whose structures are 
not easily understood by outsiders and whose values may be subject to considerable variation.  
We assume that customers do know the distribution of agents’ wealth.  We make the simplest 
possible representation of such a distribution, by assuming that a fraction s of all agents have 
wealth ȖH, while the rest (1-s) have wealth ȖL < ȖH.  Finally, we posit that an agent’s wealth is 
costlessly verifiable by the exchange during investigations of possible wrongdoings.   
B. The customer’s decision 
 Knowing  ȖL, ȖH and s, customers take as given the exchange’s enforcement policy {P, X}
and transaction fee t and choose a fee schedule to maximize their expected income from trading.  
We abstract from the possibility of offering a menu of schedules that would lead to separation of 
agents by wealth.  Instead, we posit that a single fee schedule must be offered to all agents.   
  It turns out that this one-size-fits-all schedule will guarantee participation by both agent 
types.  In such an environment, then, the key change introduced by heterogeneity is that a fee 
schedule which induces an agent with wealth ȖL to honestly report the true state may not induce 
an agent with wealth ȖH to honestly report, and vice-versa.  It is easy to see that the customer 
optimally chooses z*(w1) = w1 as in Section IV.  We now show that the customer always chooses 
z*(w2) to extract as much surplus as possible from the high-wealth agents.
Our next set of results establishes that the customer should set z(w2) so that the AIC is 
binding for at least one type of agent.  Intuitively, the trade-off when choosing z(w2) is that 
“high” values of z(w2) (i.e., values high enough that incentive-compatibility is binding for high-
wealth agents) maximize the payment from high-wealth agents but lead to misreporting by low-
wealth agents – who, given limited liability, are undeterred by high penalties.  As in Section IV, 
agents report honestly if the AIC is met. With heterogeneous agents, there are two relevant AICs:
     AIC-k      (5)   w2 – z(w2)  > p1 max{w2 – w1 – x, –Ȗk) + (1–p1) (w2 – w1)             (k=L,H) 
Lemma 4:   AIC-H is met whenever AIC-L is met.  The reverse is not true.   
Proof:  See Appendix.19
Since customers will always choose the compensation schedule so that at least one AIC is 
met in equilibrium, Lemma 4 implies that the AIC-H constraint is always met.  Given this result, 
we can now characterize the optimal contract:  
Lemma 5:   When agents are heterogeneous, customers set z*(w1) = w1 and z*(w2) = w1 + p1x12
Corollary 1: If x12 > xL, then the optimal payment schedule Z
*(W) leads to misreporting by low-
wealth agents only.  If x12 = xL, then Z
*(W) induces truth telling by all agents.
Proofs:  See Appendix.
  Lemma 5 and its Corollary show that the SRO’s choice of penalty, X, is key to whether 
all agents report honestly.  The Lemma and its Corollary also show that, if misreporting were to 
occur, it is the less-wealthy agents who would misreport.   
  In the next three subsections, we derive and then compare enforcement policies at mutual 
and for-profit SROs.  Throughout, we assume that the values of the model’s parameters 3, W, Ȗk,
a and c are such that it is profitable to operate the exchange, i.e., that the participation constraints 
of the customers and of their agents can all be met.  A sufficient condition to ensure that this 
assumption is met is that:  
  ( 6 )  
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C. The Mutual SRO’s Decision 
  As in Section IV, the MSRO selects P and X to maximize the incomes of its member 
agents, subject to ensuring customer participation.  However, whereas in Section IV agents were 
homogenous and member income was unequivocally defined, in this Section the heterogeneity of 
members raises the question of whose income the MSRO should maximize – e.g., is the median 
agent a low-wealth or a high-wealth individual?  As emphasized in previous literature (Hart and 
Moore, 1998; Pirrong, 2000), agent heterogeneity may impact MSRO policy. In the case at hand, 
if different agents prefer different choices of enforcement variables, then the values of P and X
chosen by the mutual exchange could depend on whose wealth is being maximized.   20
  We first note that, although they may ultimately prefer different levels of the penalty x12
for misreporting, both types of agents at least agree on the range of possible values for x12.  First, 
all agents want the exchange to set x12 > xLŁ w2 – w1 + ȖL.  The intuition here is similar to that in 
Section IV.  As long as x12 < xL, an increase in x12 accompanied by a reduction in p1 that leaves 
the customer’s net income unchanged will raise the incomes of all agents, since it allows for a 
reduction in enforcement costs without inducing misreporting.  Second, all agents want to set x12
< xH Ł w2 – w1 + ȖH.  Logically, given limited liability, increasing x beyond xH has no effect on 
any agent’s incentives to misreport, since the most they can lose if their misreporting is detected 
is xH.  Lemma 6 summarizes these results and their implication for the MSRO:  
Lemma 6:   Both high- and low-wealth agents prefer (and, hence, the MSRO sets) xL < x12 < xH.
  The next Lemma makes explicit that the SRO’s choice of p1 depends on its choice of x.
Lemma 7:     If x12 = xL, then the mutual SRO chooses 
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Proof:  See Appendix.
  We know from Corollary 1 that, if the SRO sets x > xL, then low-wealth agents misreport.  
In this case, as the proportion s of low-wealth individuals rises, the MSRO must adjust p1 upward 
in order to ensure customer participation.  That is:  
Corollary 2:  As long as it is optimal for the MSRO to set x12 =xH, then PM /s < 0.
 Setting  x > xLincreases low-wealth agents’ expected incomes but can reduce high-wealth 
agents’ incomes. This observation suggests that whether misreporting is allowed to take place in 
equilibrium could depend on which type of agent’s income the MSRO maximizes.  Proposition 2 
formalizes this intuition.   21
Proposition 2: The MSRO sets x12 = xL or x12 = xH.  The choice between xL and xH is a function 
of the proportion s of high-wealth agents, and may also depend on whose 
expected income the MSRO is maximizing.  In particular:   
(i) For high values of s (
2L H L 1 H L
2L H L
ʌ x( c + Ȗ -Ȗ )-ʌ (Ȗ -Ȗ )c
s=
ʌ x( c + Ȗ -Ȗ )
ˆ <s<1), the MSRO sets x12 = xH;
(ii)  For intermediate values of s, the MSRO’s enforcement policy depends on the type of 
agent whose income it maximizes:  
x x12 = xL if the exchange acts on behalf of high-wealth agents;
x x12 = xH if the exchange acts on behalf of low-wealth agents;  
(iii) For low values of s (when s <
1H 2 1 2 L
HL 2 2 1 HL
c( Į-w )x -(w -w )(ʌ x- c )
s=max{ , }
c+Ȗ -Ȗʌ (w -w )(Ȗ -Ȗ +c)
), the  
       MSRO sets x12 = xL.
Proof:  See Appendix.
  Proposition 2 implies that the general proposition that an enforcement agency will choose 
maximal fines (which allow for minimal enforcement expenditures for a given expected penalty) 
need not always apply to MSROs with heterogeneous traders.  Intuitively, the higher penalty xH
allows for a reduction in the probability of inspection p but also brings about misreporting.  As 
long as there are few low-wealth agents, this misreporting is not much of an issue, and the cost 
savings from reducing the frequency of inspections are relatively more important.  As a result, 
when s ˆ<s<1, the usual result obtains, i.e., both types of agents prefer (and the MSRO sets) x=xH.
 Increasing  x and reducing p, however, has a redistributional effect to the detriment of 
high-wealth agents.  Conditional on x>xL (so that misreporting occurs), expected customer 
income falls (and expected income for low-wealth agents is higher) as p declines (holding px
fixed).  This is because higher x does not result in higher payments from low-wealth agents once 
x exceeds xL.  This consequence of limited liability means that px must rise as x increases, in 
order to leave customers with incomes of at least Į.  That is, customers must be compensated for 
lower expected penalties, so px must increase.  This effect in turn means that high-wealth agents 
are effectively transferring income to low-wealth ones.  For intermediate values of s, then, high-
wealth agents prefer that the MSRO set x12 = xL whereas low-wealth agents prefer x12 = xH.
  Finally, if low-wealth agents are too numerous (s<s), then all agents prefer the MSRO to 
set x=xL.  First, when s is sufficiently small, expected enforcement costs can actually be higher 
with x=xH (which leads to expected costs of (ʌ1 + (1–s) ʌ2) cPM,2 because low-wealth agents 22
always report W = w1) than with x=xL (where the costs are ʌ1cPM,1).  In such a situation, low-
wealth agents may actually prefer x=xL.  Alternatively, when s is small, the transfer from high-
wealth to low-wealth agents due to misrepresentation may be so large that it is impossible for 
customers’ and high-wealth agents’ participation constraints to be met if there is misreporting.  
Choosing an x that fails to meet high-wealth agents’ participation constraint is never optimal for 
low-wealth agents.  In this case, condition (6) implies the exchange can be operated profitably – 
as long as x=xL.
  Proposition 2 complements the extant literature that shows how agent heterogeneity can 
lead to important disagreements with respect to policy at a mutual exchange.  In our setting, the 
potential disagreement becomes less important as agent heterogeneity declines.  Specifically, as s
goes to 1, all agents prefer some misreporting in equilibrium, while as s goes to 0, all agents 
prefer low penalties but vigorous monitoring.   
D. The For-Profit SRO’s Decision 
  As in Section IV, the for-profit SRO maximizes its profits (transaction fee minus 
investigation costs), subject to participation by all agents and customers.  In addition, the 
assumption that w1 < D implies that the PSRO must satisfy at least one type of agents’ truth-
telling constraint.  That is, the PSRO seeks to  
 Max  {t, P, X}   t – 3 P c 
subject to  
    AIR      (7)      ʌ1 (w1–z*(w1)) + ʌ2 (w2–z*(w2)) > 0 
    AIC*-k      (8)      w2 – z*(w2) > p1[max{w2– w1 - x, –Ȗk }]  + (1-p1) (w2–w1)         (k=L,H) 
    CIR      (9a)    w1 + ʌ2 p [sx + (1-s) (w2 -  w1 + ȖL)] – t > D
                (if 14 only holds for high-wealth agents) 
             (9b)    w1 + ʌ2px  – t   > D
                (if 14 holds for all agents) 
where the fee schedule Z
*(W) reflects the customer’s optimizing behavior derived in Lemma 5, 
and constraint (9a) reflects Lemma 4, i.e., the fact that AIC-L need not hold in equilibrium.   23
  The PSRO’s determination of P, X and t here is similar to its approach when agents are 
homogeneous.  In particular, the PSRO sets p1 to extract surplus from the agents (in the hetero-
geneous case, only high-wealth agents are necessarily driven to their reservation utility), and 
then sets t to extract surplus from customers.  The following Lemma specifies how the PSRO’s 
choices of investigation probability p1 and of the fee t depend on its choice of the penalty x.
Lemma 8:     If x12 = xL, then the for-profit SRO chooses 
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  If  x12 =xH, then the for-profit SRO chooses 
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Proof:  See Appendix.
  The next Proposition identifies the for-profit exchange’s optimal choice of penalties.   
Proposition 3: The PSRO either sets x = xL or x = xH.  It sets x = xH when the proportion s of 
high-wealth agents is high (s ˆ<s<1), and sets x = xL otherwise (0<s<s ˆ).
Proof:  See Appendix. ͕
E. Comparison of Ownership Structures 
  A comparison of Propositions 2 and 3 shows that the for-profit exchange’s enforcement 
policy is stricter than its mutual counterpart’s in two ways.  First, there are parameter values 
(s<s<s ˆ) for which the PSRO prevents misreporting while the MSRO may allow misreporting.  
The opposite is not true.  That is, for any set of parameter values for which the mutual SRO 
prevents all misreporting, the for-profit SRO also prevents all misreporting (0<s<s ˆ).
  At first blush, it might appear that the extent of misreporting in our model is of little 
consequence, in that customers get the same ex ante utility whether or not misreporting occurs.  
However, if some misreporting does occur in equilibrium, it means that customers are ex post
randomly made better- or worse-off by this very misreporting.  Such randomness is precisely the 
kind of outcome that trade-practice rules are designed to eliminate.   24
  Second, whenever the PSRO and the MSRO agree on whether to allow some (s ˆ<s<1) or 
to prevent all (0<s<s ˆ) misreporting, the investigation probability is always higher at the PSRO.  
That is, it is readily shown that PF,2 > PM,2 when s ˆ<s<1 and that PF,1 > PM,1 when (0<s<s ˆ).
  The reason why the PSRO enforces customer protection rules more rigorously for any 
given fine is the same as in the homogeneous agent case.  For any given x, the PSRO wants to 
choose a detection probability at which the AIR is just binding.  That is necessarily at least as 
high as the detection probability that maximizes agent profits (which is the goal of the MSRO).   
  When the exchange sets x such that misreporting occurs, the percentage of low-wealth 
agents (s) affects outcomes in a different way for the mutual and for-profit SRO.  As indicated in 
Lemma 7, the MSRO has to increase p as s falls, in order to induce customer participation.  In 
contrast, the PSRO reduces t when s falls in order to induce customer participation, but p is 
unaffected.  In the former case, high-wealth agents are worse off as s rises, while in the latter 
case, the SRO’s owners are made worse off.   
  Figure 6 provides a numerical example of the relationship between exchange ownership 
structure, detection probability P, and proportion s of high-wealth agents.  When agents are 
overwhelmingly high-wealth types (s>0.88; case (ii) in Proposition 2), both the MSRO and the 
PSRO set x=xH.  The mutual’s investigation probability PM,2= 0.374 at s = 0.88 and is decreasing 
in s (Corollary 2), while the for-profit’s PF,2 is larger (PF,2 = 0.375) and independent of s.  In that 
case, low-wealth agents misreport the good state in equilibrium.  If the proportion s of high-
wealth agents is “low” (s<0.83; case (i) in Proposition 2), then the MSRO and PSRO both set 
x=xL and deter misreporting by raising the investigation probability to, respectively, PM,1 = 0.48 
or PF,1 = .49 > PM,1.  Finally, for intermediate values of s (0.83<s<0.88; case (iii) in Proposition 
2), the PSRO sets p1 = PF,1 = 0.49 whereas the MSRO either sets x=xL and p = PM,1 = 0.48 to 
benefit the high-wealth agents or, alternatively, or sets x=xH and p = PM,2<0.374 to benefit low-
wealth agents.   
VI. Other Extensions 
Section V established that the key result of Proposition 1 is robust to the introduction of 
agent heterogeneity and, by showing that misreporting is more likely when the SRO is a mutual 
exchange, suggested an additional dimension in which demutualization might lead to a more, 25
rather than less, rigorous trading environment.  In this Section, we investigate two other 
extensions of the basic model of Section IV.  In Section VI.A, we establish the robustness of our 
main results to the assumption that agent income cannot be negative, i.e., that z(wi) is restricted 
to being less than or equal to wi (i=1,2).  Finally, in Section VI.B, we examine the assumption 
that the exchange can credibly precommit to all the aspects of its enforcement policy, and discuss 
the potential for ex-post opportunistic SRO behavior with respect to enforcement activities.   
A.  Equilibrium with the potential for non-negative returns to truth-telling agents 
  The analysis in Section IV imposes the restriction that customers choose fee schedules 
Z(W) such that the agent’s earnings in both states is at least 0.  This restriction seems consistent 
with actual practice.  That is, in reality, it does not appear that agents are required to give 
customers a payment in excess of the agent’s actual receipts when the agent honestly reports that 
receipts were “low.”  Still, it may be that in practice agents lose money when they report a low 
receipt, in that agents face positive trading costs which they do not recover in the low state.   
  In this subsection, we consider how the equilibrium changes when the no-loss constraint 
in (3) is replaced by the (weaker) no-bankruptcy constraint that the payment to the customer in 
any state can never be greater than the actual receipt of the agent plus the agent’s wealth J.  With 
this change, the constraint in equation (2) is no longer redundant.  That is, agents must earn non-
negative profits in expectation, but they can lose money in any state – even when they give an 
honest report.  We now show that allowing for this possibility allows the agents/SRO to earn 
more than in the case evaluated in Section IV, but that our main conclusions remain unchanged.   
  To analyze this case, we return to the assumption that agents are homogeneous with 
respect to Ȗ and then revisit the behavior of customers and SROs, replacing the agent’s NLC 
condition (3) with the agent bankruptcy constraint:
    (ABC)  (3’)      wi– z(wi) – xij > – Ȗ, i = 1,2 
 The  agent’s  wealth,  Ȗ, plays a somewhat different role in this model.  If Ȗ > 0, customers 
can offer a contract to the agent that yields the agent negative revenues when he announces state 
1.  Specifically, analogously to Section IV, the customer’s profit-maximizing choice of z(w1) is 
the highest z(w1) consistent with (3’), which is z*(w1) = w1 + Ȗ in this model.  The agent’s 26
income is thus–Ȗ when he announces the true state is state 1.  As above, this not only maximizes 
the customer’s payment when state 1 occurs, but also allows for higher z(w2).  Given z(w1) = w1
+ Ȗ, the customer will then choose z(w2) so that the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, 
which means that w2 – z(w2) = p[max{w2 – z(w1) – x, –Ȗ}]  + (1–p)(w2 – z(w1)).  Hence, for x <
w2– w1, the binding AIC is z(w2) =  z (w1) + px.
  Figure 7 depicts the customer’s decision in this alternative model.  The main difference 
between the decision here and that portrayed in Figure 2 is that, rather than indirectly shifting the 
AIC curve upward as in Section IV, changes in Ȗ shift the constraint in equation (3’).  That is, in 
the present variation of the model, increasing Ȗ shifts the vertical ABC line to the right, allowing 
higher z(w1) for fixed p1 and x12.  Hence, the customer’s optimum either occurs at the intersection 
of the AIC and the NBC (as portrayed in Figure 7), or at the intersection of the AIC and the AIR 
– depending on the value of Ȗ.  In particular, as discussed below, if Ȗ is sufficiently large, then 
the latter intersection will be the customer’s optimum in equilibrium.   
  Given this behavior by customers, the mutual SRO once again chooses values for p and x
to maximize the agent’s income.  As our earlier analysis implies, the SRO chooses a maximal 
value for x, which in this case is x = w2– w1.  The logic here is again that, if x were less than w2–
w1, then x could be increased and p could be decreased without changing the agent’s or the 
customer’s incomes, but saving the customer enforcement costs.  The reason why x is lower in 
this model than in the model in Section IV is that agents pay Ȗ whenever they announce state 1 
has occurred, which reduces the maximum penalty that the SRO can assess when the agent is 
discovered misreporting the true state.  This means that the choice of z(w2) that results in the 
incentive compatibility constraint’s binding is 
 z(w2) =  p(w1 + x)   + (1-p)(w1) =  w1 + Ȗ + p(w2 – w1).
As long as Ȗ < D – w1 then the SRO will choose p so that the CIR is binding, or
ʌ2z(w2) + ʌ1 z(w1) – t = D.
Solving these two equations for p, and recalling that t = ʌ1 p1 c for the mutual SRO, yields  
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  Note that, as long as Ȗ < D – w1, P’M is decreasing in Ȗ, as was the case for model 
presented in Section IV.
21  Here, higher agent wealth allows the customer to create greater 
incentives for truth-telling via the fee schedule, which in turn allows the MSRO to achieve the 
same degree of deterrence with a lower probability of detection.   
 For  Ȗ > D -w1, P’M will equal 0.  In contrast to the MSRO’s decision in the earlier model, 
in this model the CIR can be satisfied even when p = 0.  Customers receive z(w1) = Ȗ + w1when 
the agent claims the state is state 1.  When p = 0, the AIC implies z(w2) = z(w1) = Ȗ + w1.  Hence 
if Ȗ + w1 > D, this payment is greater than the customer’s reservation value, and the MSRO will 
indeed set P’M = 0.  Once Ȗ is greater than D – w1, higher Ȗ transfers income from the agent to 
the customer.  However, for Ȗ > ʌ2 (w2 – w1) > D – w1, the AIR is binding, and hence higher Ȗ
has no additional effect on fees.
  For the for-profit SRO, the optimization problem is once again to set p and x to extract all 
agent surplus, and then set t to extract all of the customer’s surplus.  For the reasons described 
above, the PSRO will set x at its maximum consist with x  w2 – z(w1) + Ȗ, or x = w2 – w1.  As in 
Section IV, increasing p allows the PSRO to increase t.  Increasing p is profitable as long as 
t/p > ʌ1 c (i.e, the change in t resulting from the higher p exceeds the marginal cost of raising 
p).  When z(w1) = w1 + Ȗ and x = w2 – w1 so that z(w2) = w1 + Ȗ + p (w2 – w1), the CIR becomes 
(8’)   p(w2 – w1)  = (D + t – Ȗ – w1/ʌ2
This implies that t/p = ʌ2 (w2 – w1), and since ʌ2 (w2 – w1) > ʌ1 c (which is the range of values 
for which P’M > 0), the PSRO will continue to increase p until condition (2) is binding.
 Once  p is sufficiently high that (2) is binding, any further increase in p will require z*(w1)
to fall with p in order to induce the agent to participate.  At that point, higher p only transfers 
income between states for both the agent and the customer; it does not allow the PSRO to 
increase revenue.  As such, since c > 0, increases in p are no longer profitable.   At the point 
where the CIR is binding, ʌ2 (w1+ Ȗ  + p(w2 – w1)) + ʌ1 (w1 + Ȗ) = ʌ2 w2 + ʌ1w1, or
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   and    t = w1 + ʌ2 (w2 - w1) – D
                                                
21 Note that in order for the AIR to be satisfied,  ʌ2 (w2 – z(w2)) + ʌ1 (w1 – z(w1)) must be positive, or equivalently,  
ʌ2([(w2– w1)– (w2–w1)( (Į – w1- Ȗ)/(ʌ2(w2– w1) - ʌ1 c)] > Ȗ.28
  As with the mutual SRO, the probability of detection is a function of Ȗ.  The probability 
of detection upon a report of a poor outcome by the agent is P’F= 1 if J = 0, while P’Fis between 
0 and 1 for Ȗİ  (0, ʌ2(w2– w1)).  As was the case for the mutual SRO, we have P’F/Ȗ < 0.  The 
intuition for P’F/Ȗ < 0 is again that higher agent wealth increases the payment the customer 
receives and reduces the payment to the agent in state 1.  This allows the PSRO to induce honest 
reporting with a lower frequency of inspection.  Analogously with P’M, P’F goes to 0 for Ȗ
sufficiently large.  And, as was the case for the mutual SRO, beyond some point (here Ȗ = ʌ2[w2
– w1]) higher agent wealth transfers income from the SRO owners to the customers.   
  As in the analysis in Section IV, P’F> P’M, if ʌ2 (w2 – w1) – ʌ1 c > D – w1 (recalling that, 
if the inequality fails, there is no gain to trading when Ȗ = 0).
Proposition 4: If conditions are such that the AIR can be satisfied, then P’F> P’M,and P’F> P’M
for Ȗ < D - w1,
Proof:  See Appendix.
  A second and related difference between mutual and for-profit SRO is that, if the SRO 
could choose its Ȗ, the Ȗ chosen by the for-profit SRO would be larger.  In other words, ceteris 
paribus, a for-profit SR exchange strictly prefers wealthier agents (Futures Commission 
Merchants or FCMs in futures markets) than does a mutual SR exchange.  There are two possible 
interpretations of this finding.  (i) First, as noted above, there has been a shift from mutual to for-
profit SROs over the past decade.  One potential reason for that shift is that exogenous changes 
have occurred in technology or competition that have increased Ȗ or Į (increased competition can 
be thought of as an increase in Į).  (ii) Second, if one treats Ȗ as a choice variable for the SRO, 
then the implication is that the for-profit SRO will choose a larger Ȗ.  Whether this is interpreted 
in terms of increased agent wealth or increased agent productivity is something we turn to below.   
B.  Observability of enforcement parameters and the role of government 
  Like extant CSV models in the financial agency literature, our analysis assumes that the 
enforcement parameters are observable by all agents.  This is an important feature of the model, 
in that the choice of these parameters by the SRO affects the fee schedule set by the customers.   29
  One might be concerned that this assumption could deviate from reality in a significant 
way if (i) it were plausible that P and X may not be observable in reality and (ii) SROs had 
incentives to deviate from the announced P and X once customers have set the schedule Z(W).  In 
practice, while the fines chosen by an SRO are arguably transparent, it seems plausible that 
customers may not be able to observe the true likelihood of detection chosen by the SRO.
  In the case of a mutual SRO, reducing the detection probability p1 below PM can both 
increase agent income and reduce costs.  That is, once the fee schedule is set and customers start 
trading, the MSRO could conceivably communicate its intention to lower p1 to the agents, with 
the results that these agents will all misreport (and earn more) and that the MSRO will save on 
enforcement expenditures.  By contrast, once the fee schedule is set, the incentive for the for-
profit SRO to reduce p only comes about through the potential to save enforcement costs. Unlike 
the MSRO, the PSRO does not increase its revenues by reducing p1.  If anything, this difference 
in the net benefit from reducing p1 at mutual versus for-profit SROs reinforces our earlier 
conclusion that a PSRO will have stricter enforcement policies.   
  Of course, several factors also mitigate an SRO’s ex-post incentives to reduce p1.  First, 
for mutual SROs, saving costs by reducing p may not be to the agents’ benefit, even in the short 
run (although the benefit of higher expected agent revenue from lower p is unambiguous).  This 
is because the mutual, non-profit organization form can be viewed as a commitment to a certain 
level of enforcement expenditures.  That is, with the mutual form, transaction fees are set equal 
to enforcement expenditures, so that members may receive no direct benefit from a reduction in 
enforcement costs.
22  And, in the case of for-profit SROs, the enforcement budget is ex-post
observable (e.g., by reading the company’s annual report) and thus deviations will harm the 
PSRO’s reputation.
23
  Second, for both kinds of SROs, customers may rationally anticipate such opportunistic 
ex-post behavior.  Hence, if it is indeed profitable to cut p1 once fee schedules are set and 
customers decide to trade, then the fee schedules Z(W) will reflect that potential.  In turn, this 
response by customers will reduce agent and/or shareholder income.  Thus, SROs will attempt to 
establish a reputation, whereby it is costly to them to deviate from the probabilities derived in the 
static environment of Sections IV, V and VI.A.
                                                
22 Perhaps the concern expressed by various regulatory agencies that for-profit SROs will cut enforcement spending 
reflects the differential effect of cost savings from reduced enforcement expenditures for the two kinds of SROs.   
23 DeMarzo, Fishman & Hagerty (2007) formally model the effect of reputation on agents' incentives to misreport.30
  A formal consideration of the potential for opportunistic behavior on the part of SROs is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  These considerations do have some implications for the role of 
regulatory authorities towards enforcement of rules against misreporting (such as trade-practice 
rules in the futures context), however.  Specifically, DFH suggest that the threat of duplicative 
government enforcement can induce mutual SROs to increase the probability of detection.  This 
can increase customer welfare (and in a model in which Į is heterogeneous, increase social 
welfare).  In the case of for-profit SROs, that policy is less likely to be welfare-enhancing, 
because increases in p beyond PF do not increase customer welfare.  The potential for 
opportunism suggests that government policy might better be aimed at insuring that SROs 
provide the promised level of enforcement.  As a practical matter, this intervention might consist 
of reviewing an SRO’s budgeted resources for enforcement, and monitoring the level of actual 
expenditure, to insure against opportunistic behavior.  In addition, since profit maximization 
(absent opportunism) increases enforcement expenditures, policies that lead for-profit SROs 
closer to the objective of maximizing shareholder income should result in greater enforcement.
VII. Conclusion
  This paper analyzes how a self-regulatory financial exchange (SRO) might make use of 
penalties and incentives to influence contracts between investors and their agents.  Of particular 
interest is how the SRO’s ownership structure (for-profit vs. mutual) influences its enforcement 
policy.  Broadly speaking, we find that a for-profit SRO uses more “sticks” and fewer “carrots” 
to provide incentives for agents to report honestly to their clients.  That is, a for-profit SRO 
spends more on enforcement than a mutual SRO.  We also find that trade-practice violations are 
more likely (that is, occur for additional parameter values) when the SRO is a mutual exchange.  
  We have tried to capture the essence of alternative ownership structures in a tractable 
environment by limiting the strategy space.  Nevertheless, we think that the basic effects we find 
should carry over to richer environments.  For example, because we model a static environment, 
we limit the analysis to monetary fines.  In a dynamic environment, the SRO would have the 
ability to suspend the trading privileges of an agent that violates a trade-practice rule.  In that 
case, the agent’s wealth parameter Ȗ would reflect future trading profits, which could differ 
between a for-profit and a mutual SRO.  In particular, since agents earn less when the SRO is 31
for-profit (and, hence, have less to lose from a trading ban), a for-profit SRO – which we find to 
be a stricter enforcer than its mutual counterpart – will have to rely on an even greater likelihood 
of inspection to insure against misreporting. 
  The role of agent heterogeneity is simplified in our model, in that we abstract from the 
possibility that it may affect the decision to demutualize in the first place.  Still, previous work 
(e.g., Pirrong, 2000; Hart and Moore, 1998) has emphasized the role of heterogeneity in the 
choice of organizational structure.  To the extent that agent heterogeneity does influence that 
choice, an interesting extension of our analysis of the enforcement of customer protection rules 
would be to integrate the endogeneity of the form of ownership structure. Another interesting 
venue for further work would be to analyze how demutualization affects the enforcement of 
other rules governing the behavior of agents at financial exchanges, such as rules against price 
manipulation or illegal insider trading.   
  We show that the mutual SRO selects the weakest intensity of monitoring that is 
consistent with customer participation, whereas the for-profit SRO selects the highest intensity of 
monitoring that is consistent with agent participation.  In that sense, government mandates of 
stricter enforcement are unlikely to improve customer welfare at PSROs.  In our stylized model, 
however, all transactions take place at a single exchange.  Yet, transactions involving two or 
more exchanges have become numerous in recent years amidst a sharp increase in the volume of 
complex financial transactions.  Another interesting avenue for further research would therefore 
be to analyze the role of the government in monitoring trader behavior when transactions involve 
two or more exchanges, and to investigate how such a role could be affected by demutualization.   
  Finally, it would be interesting to test our model’s predictions.  For example, controlling 
for the evolution of technology (such as monitoring improvements made possible by electronic 
trading) and the product market (in particular, changes in the competitive landscape), have 
enforcement budgets and staff grown after demutualization?  Has the investigation frequency 
gone up?  In a similar vein, could the improvement in liquidity and the drop in spreads that have 
been found to follow demutualization (Krishnamurti et al., 2003; Treptow, 2006) be linked to 
changes in enforcement incentives and practices?  We leave these questions for further research.   32
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Figure 2: The Customer’s Problem 
Notes: Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of the constraints that the customer faces when 
choosing the agent’s compensation schedule {w1-z(w1), w2-z(w2)}.  The agent’s incentive 
compatibility constraint (1) is depicted by the 45-degree AIC line z(w2) = z(w1) + p1 x12.  To 
ensure truth-telling, z(w2) must lie on or below this line.  The agent’s individual rationality 
constraint (2) is depicted by the downward-sloping AIR line z(w2) = w2 + ʌ1w1/ʌ2 – ʌ1z(w1)/ʌ2.
To get participation, z(w2) must lie on or below this line.  Finally, the no-loss condition (3) is 
depicted for i = 1 by the vertical line NLC at z(w2) = w1.  To respect limited liability, z(w2) must 
lie to the left of this line.  The striped fived-sided area depicts the combinations of z(w1) and 
z(w2) that simultaneously meet all three constraints (AIC, AIR and NLC).   
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Figure 3: The Mutual SRO’s Choice of Investigation Probability 
Notes: Figure 3 illustrates how the mutual SRO’s choice of investigation probability, p1, affects 
the agent’s and the customer’s respective expected utilities.  Ceteris paribus, by increasing p1
from p’ to p”, the SRO shifts the AIC upward and increases the customer’s expected income 
from C1 < D  to C0= D.
z(w2) = z(w1) + p’ x12
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Figure 4: Effect of Agent Wealth on Mutual SRO Policy 
Notes: Figure 4 illustrates the relation between customer income and the exogenous agent-wealth 
parameter, Ȗ.  If Ȗ increases from Ȗ’ to Ȗ”, then the optimal penalty x = w2 – w1+ Ȗ increases and 
the customer, ceteris paribus, could attain a higher expected income (moving from C0 to C2) and 
the agent would move to a lower income (holding p1 constant at p’).  Accordingly, as long as w1
< D, the SRO lowers p1 as Ȗ increases (from p’ to p” in this depiction), which reduces the 
customer’s expected income back to D.  By reducing the expected investigation costs p1S2c, this 
reduction in p1 increases the combined agent-customer income net of the fees t = p1S2c and, thus, 
raises the agent’s expected income.   
z(w2) = z(w1) + p’x12’ = z(w1) + p”x12”
z(w1)
z(w2)
direction of 
increasing
customer 
income 
direction of 
increasing
agent utility 
w1
AIR
C2>D
C0=D
customer’s 
optimum 
with J J’
z(w2) = z(w1) + p’x12”39
Figure 5: The For-Profit SRO’s Problem 
Notes: Figure 5 illustrates the for-profit SRO’s optimization.  C0 is the income level associated 
with the customer’s participation constraint, i.e., with the CIR condition (4).  A0 is the income 
level associated with the agent’s participation constraint, i.e., with the AIR condition (2).  As in 
Figure 4, z*(w2) = z*(w1) + p1 (w2 - w1) is the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (1), and 
the vertical NLC line at w1 reflects the no-loss constraint (3).  For some arbitrary value of p1 <
PF, say p’, the agent would expect income A1> A0, and t would be set equal to A1– C0.  As p1 is 
increased towards PF, the agent’s income falls towards A0, and t can be increased without 
violating condition (4).  Thus, the equilibrium fee t is the vertical distance between A0 and C0,
with p1 = PF.
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Figure 6 – Detection Probability with Heterogeneous Agents 
Figure 6 - Investigation Probabilities with Heterogeneous Agents
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When s<0.82, the PSRO optimally sets x=xL and sets the investigation probability p 
high enough that low-wealth agents never misreport in equilibrium.
Optimal investigation probability p when s<0.82. The MSRO sets 
x=xL, which rules out any misreporting in equilibrium.
If s>0.83 and if the MSRO chooses to set x=xH,  then the 
investigation probability p falls with s; in this case,  low-wealth 
agents misreport the good state in equilibrium. If s>0.89,  the MSRO 
always sets x=xH.
If s>0.83, the 
PSRO always sets 
H
If when 0.83<s<0.89, the MSRO sets either x=xL or x=xH.
Notes: Figure 6 provides a numerical example of the relationship between exchange ownership 
structure, detection probability P, and proportion s of high-wealth agents.  Parameter values are 
set to Į = 1.5, ȖH = 2 > ȖL = 1.25, ʌ1 = 0.5, c = 0.25, w2 = 2.2, and w1 = 1.  When agents are 
overwhelmingly high-wealth types (s>0.88; case (ii) in Proposition 2), both the MSRO and the 
PSRO set x=xH.  The mutual’s investigation probability PM,2= 0.374 at s = 0.88 and is decreasing 
in s (Corollary 2), while the for-profit’s PF,2 is larger (PF,2 = 0.375) and independent of s.  In that 
case, low-wealth agents misreport the good state in equilibrium.  If the proportion s of high-
wealth agents is “low” (s<0.83; case (i) in Proposition 2), then the MSRO and the PSRO both set 
x=xL and deter misreporting by raising the investigation probability to, respectively, PM,1 = 0.48 
or PF,1 = .49 > PM,1.  Finally, for intermediate values of s (0.83<s<0.88; case (iii) in Proposition 
2), the PSRO sets p1 = PF,1 = 0.49 whereas either the MSRO sets x=xL and p = PM,1 = 0.48 to 
benefit the high-wealth agents or, alternatively, or the MSRO sets x=xH and p = PM,2 < 0.374 to 
benefit low-wealth agents.   41
Figure 7: Importance of Agent-Liability Limits  
Notes: Figure 7 illustrates the relation between customer income and the exogenous agent-wealth 
parameter, Ȗ, in the event that agent income can be negative in some states of the world.  In 
Figure 2, the agent’s income is restricted to non-negative values in all states of the world, i.e., the 
no-loss condition (3) required that z(w1)  w1.  This constraint is represented by the vertical NLC 
line above.  In Figure 7, this no-loss constraint is replaced by the weaker requirement that the 
agent can lose money in some states of the world, but only to the extent that his wealth J is 
sufficient to cover the loss: z(w1)  w1J.  This weaker no-bankruptcy condition is represented by 
the vertical ABC line above.  Ceteris paribus, relaxing the NLC allows the customer to attain a 
higher expected income (moving from C0 to C1) and forces the agent to a lower income (holding 
p1constant).
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Appendix: Proofs. 
Lemma 2:   The mutual SRO sets 
1
1
22 1 1 ()
M
w
pp
ww c
D
SJ S

  

; p2 = 0, x12 = w2 – w1 + Ȗ;
        and xij = 0 for all other i,j.
Proof:  To see that p2= 0 and x2j = 0 (j=1,2), note that condition (3) requires that z(w1) < D, so 
condition (4) requires z(w2) > D > z(w1).  Because z(w2) > z(w1), the revelation principle 
implies that we can restrict our attention to contracts that induce truthful reporting by 
agents.  As such, there is no reason for an SRO to set p2 > 0, since the agent will never 
report that state 2 occurred if state 1 actually occurred.  Consequently, x2j is irrelevant, 
and we therefore set it equal to 0.
  To show that x12 Ł  x = w2 – w1+ Ȗ, first note that if x < w2 – w1+ Ȗ  then the agent’s 
income is  ʌ2 (w2 – w1 – px).  Suppose x = x’ < w2 – w1 + Ȗ, and let p’ be the value of p
such that the CIR is satisfied when x = x’.  Let p’x’ = k.  It follows that agent income is 
the same for any p as long as px = k.  Customer income is ʌ2 (w1 + px) + ʌ1 w1 – ʌ1pc,
and therefore decreasing in p for x = k/p.  Hence, setting x = w2 – w1 + Ȗ (rather than x’)
has no direct effect on agent’s income, but relaxes the CIR, allowing the agent to 
profitably increase his income without violating the CIR.   
 To  determine  p, note that for given z*(w1) and z*(w2, Ȗ) functions, the agent’s wealth is 
decreasing in px.  Therefore, the MSRO will choose the minimum px that is consistent 
with condition (4’).  Since we know that x = w2 – w1+ Ȗ, the MSRO will choose the 
smallest p that satisfies  
(A.1)     z*(w2) > (D– ʌ1 (w1 – c p))/ʌ2
or, given the customer’s optimal fee schedule,  
(A.1’)   w1 + p1(w2 – w1 + Ȗ) > (D– ʌ1 (w1 – c p1))/ʌ2
This implies that, if  ʌ2(w2 – w1 + Ȗ) – ʌ1 c < D – w1, then there is no p < 1 that allows 
the MSRO to provide customers with an expected income > D.  In a similar vein, unless 
(w2 – w1 + Ȗ)( ʌ1 w1 + ʌ2 w2– Į) > ʌ1 c (w2 – w1), the AIR cannot be met.  Both the CIR 
and the AIR are met as long as there are gains from trade – which is guaranteed by our 
assumption that ʌ1 w1+ ʌ2 w2 > D + ʌ1 c.  Solving (A.1’) yields:
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Lemma 3:   The for-profit SRO sets 
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; p2 = 0, x12 = w2 – w1 + Ȗ;
        and xij = 0 for all other i,j; and, t = w1 + ʌ2 PF x – D  = w1 + ʌ2 (w2 – w1) – D43
Proof:   By the same logic as for the MSRO, the PSRO sets x = x12 = w2 – w1 + Ȗ.  To find PF,
note that the CIR condition (4) must be binding.  That is, (4) can be written:
    (A.2) ʌ2 p (w2 – w1 + Ȗ) = D + t – w1
Because z*(w1) = w1, the NLC condition (3) is binding in state 1 for any p.  Condition (3) 
will be binding in state 2 if z*(w2) = w2, i.e., if p = (w2 – w1)/x.
If condition (3) is not binding in state 2, then the optimal transaction fee solves the 
PSRO’s first order condition with respect to t, so that
    (A.3)  1 – ʌ1c p/t = 0,
where, p/t is the slope of the CIR constraint (8), holding customer income fixed at D.
This slope is equal to 1/((w2 – w1+Ȗ) ʌ2)>0, and therefore (9) can be written 
    (A.3’)  1 – ʌ1c/((w2 – w1+ Ȗ) ʌ2) = 0.
Given that c < ʌ2 (w2 – w1 + Ȗ)/ ʌ1, it follows from (A.3’) that, as long as equation (3) is 
not binding in state 2, the PSRO should increase the transactions fee t and the detection 
probability p, in order to keep customers at income level D.  As long as (3) is not binding, 
the SRO can raise p, resulting in a higher z*(w2), without violating any other constraint.
Once t is sufficiently large that the resulting z*(w2) is high enough that the NLC (3) is 
binding, then further increases in t are not profitable.  That is, once (3) is binding in state 
2, the PSRO can only increase p (without inducing agent exit) by reducing x.  Since the 
optimal penalty is  x = w2 – w1+ Ȗ , it will not be profitable to increase p beyond 
21
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Given this choice of p, the PSRO chooses t to set customer income equal to D (so that 
equation (4’) binds), or t = w1 + ʌ2 PF (w2 – w1+ Ȗ) – D  = w1 + ʌ2 (w2 – w1) – D.
Finally, the PSRO will not operate unless profits are positive, i.e., unless: 
ʌ2(w2 – w1) – ʌ1 c(w2 – w1)/(w2 – w1 +Ȗ) > D – w1
This condition, which also ensures customer participation, is satisfied given our 
assumption that there are gains from trade, i.e., that ʌ1 w1+ ʌ2 w2 > D + ʌ1 c. ͕
Proposition 1:  The for-profit SRO spends at least as much on enforcement as does the mutual SRO.   
Proof:  From Lemmas 2 and 3, we have  
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is the case given ʌ1 w1+ ʌ2 w2 > D + ʌ1 c and, hence, ʌ2 (w2 – w1) – ʌ1 c > D – w1. ͕44
Lemma 4:   AIC-H is met whenever AIC-L is met.  The reverse is not true.   
Proof:  There are two cases to consider, depending on the SRO’s choice for the penalty x.
(i) If the SRO has set x < w2 – w1 + ȖL, then ȖL does not enter the AIC.  In this first case, 
the Lemma holds trivially.   
(ii) If the SRO has instead set x > w2 – w1+ ȖL, then the right-hand side of AIC-L equals 
–pȖL + (1–p) (w2 – w1).  In this second case, it follows from (5) and from x > w2 – w1+ ȖL
that AIC-H is met whenever AIC-L is met – whereas the reverse is not true.  ͕
Lemma 5:  When agents are heterogeneous, customers set z*(w1) = w1 and z*(w2) = w1 + p1x12
Corollary 1: If x12 > xL, then the optimal payment schedule Z
*(W) leads to misreporting by low-
wealth agents.  If x12 = xL, then Z
*(W) induces truth telling by all agents.   
Proof:  Using the same logic as in Lemma 1, it is immediate that z*(w1) = w1.  In regard to the 
customer’s choice of z*(w2), there are two cases to consider, depending on the SRO’s 
choice for the penalty x.
(i) If the SRO has set x12 < xLŁw2 – w1 + ȖL, then ȖL does not enter the AIC.  This case is 
similar to the situation in Section IV, with the customer choosing z*(w2) = w1 + p1 x12 and 
no misreporting taking place in equilibrium.   
(ii) If the SRO has set x12 > xL, the right-hand side of AIC-L equals –pȖL + (1–p) (w2–w1).
In this case, the customer’s choice of z*(w2) determines whether AIC-L is binding.   
 If the customer chooses z(w2) = w1+ p12 xL, then even low-wealth agents have no 
incentive to misreport the state, since the AIC binds for them.  This in turn implies that 
the customer will never set z(w2) < w1+ p12 xL.  Indeed, setting z(w2) below w1+ p12 xL
would reduce customer’s revenue without changing the agent’s incentive to misreport, 
and hence is strictly dominated by z(w2) = w1+ p12 xL.
 An alternative choice for the customer is to set z(w2) = w1 + p12 x > w1 + p12 xL.
By doing so, the customer can get p12(x–xL) more from high-wealth agents when the 
good state occurs.  However, if the SRO has set x > xL and the customer has chosen 
z(w2) = w1+ px, then the low-wealth agent’s AIC becomes w2 – w1 – px > –p ȖL + (1–
p) (w2 – w1), or w2 – w1 + ȖL > x.  Since x > w2 – w1+ ȖL in this case, it follows that the 
low-wealth agent’s AIC does not hold, and that he will misreport when state 2 occurs.  
This means that the revenue a customer can expect to receive from a low-wealth agent 
when she chooses z(w2) = w1 + px is w1 + pxL< w1 + px.
By assumption, the customer takes the exchange’s enforcement policy as 
exogenous and focuses solely on the marginal impact, on her expected income from 
trading, of her tolerating misreporting by low-wealth agents.  Hence, given that z*(w1)
= w1 in all cases, the customer will prefer to set z(w2) = w1 + px and to face a positive 
probability of misreporting – rather than to lower z(w2) to w1 + pxL so as to discourage 
all misreporting – as long as  
    (A.4)      s (w1 + px) + (1–s) [w1 + pxL] > w1 + pxL
The left-hand of (A.4) represents the customer’s expected revenue in state 2 when 
some misreporting takes place, and the right-hand side is the expected revenue when x45
= xL and no misreporting occurs. Since this inequality holds for all x > xL, it is optimal 
for the customer to set the fee schedule so as to maximize the revenue received from 
high-wealth types.  Put differently, when x > xL, the customer chooses z*(w2) = w1 + 
px (thereby allowing some misreporting) rather than setting z(w2) sufficiently low to 
discourage all misreporting.  ͕
Lemma 7:     If x12 = xL, then the mutual SRO chooses 
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  If  x12 =xH, then 
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Proof:  Since agents’ income is decreasing in p (holding x constant), the mutual SRO wants to 
choose the minimal p consistent with the customer’s participation constraint (CIR).   
 (i)  When  x = xL, the CIR for all agents is ʌ1 w1 + ʌ2 [w1 + p xL] - ʌ1cp > D, or 
  w 1 + ʌ2 p xL - ʌ1cp > D,
 Solving  for  p yields 
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  The last expression is the same as that found in Lemma 2 when agents are homogenous.   
 (ii)  When  x > xL, xL is the maximum fine that can be imposed on a low-wealth agent.  
Hence, as stated in Corollary 1, AIC-L will be violated and low-wealth agents will 
misreport.   This violation implies that, for x > xL, the CIR becomes   
  w 1 + ʌ2 [spx + (1-s)pxL] – [ʌ1+ (1-s) ʌ2 ] pc > D
  where, the probability ʌ1+ (1-s) ʌ2 of having state 1 reported reflects misreporting of 
state 2 by low-wealth agents.   
  In particular, when x = xH, the CIR simplifies to  
  w 1 + ʌ2 p[xL + s(ȖH - ȖL)] - [ʌ1+ (1-s) ʌ2 ] cp > D
 Solving  for  p yields 
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͕46
Proposition 2: The MSRO sets x12 = xL or x12 = xH .  The choice between xL and xH is a function 
of the proportion s of high-wealth agents, and may also depend on whose 
expected income the MSRO is maximizing.  In particular:   
  (a) For sufficiently low values of s (s < s ) , the MSRO sets x12 = xL
  (b) For sufficiently high values of s (s > s ˆ) the MSRO sets x12 = xH
  (c)    Otherwise (for intermediate values of s), the MSRO’s enforcement policy 
  depends on the type of agent whose income it maximizes:  
x x12 = xL if the exchange acts on behalf of high-wealth agents;
x x12 = xH if the exchange acts on behalf of low-wealth agents.   
 Where     
2L H L 1 H L
2L H L
ʌ x( c + Ȗ -Ȗ )-ʌ (Ȗ -Ȗ )c
s=
ʌ x( c + Ȗ -Ȗ )
ˆ   and
   
1H 2 1 2 L
HL 2 2 1 HL
c( Į-w )x -(w -w )(ʌ x- c )
s=max{ , }
c+Ȗ -Ȗʌ (w -w )(Ȗ -Ȗ +c)
Proof:  We first establish that the MSRO always sets either x = xLor x = xH.  Since Lemma 6 
implies that x > w2 – w1 + ȖLŁ xL, proving this first claim is equivalent to showing that 
every agent either prefers xLto any x İ (xL, xH] or prefers xH to any x İ [xL xH).
Low-wealth agents: whenever x > xL, low-wealth agents misreport (see Corollary 1).  
Hence, as long as high-wealth agents participate, each low-wealth agent will earn an 
expected income of  
ʌ2 [(1–p)(w2–w1) – p ȖL]
which is decreasing in p and independent of x.  Since, once x is strictly greater than xL, an 
increase in x allows the MSRO to decrease p without inducing customer exit, low-wealth 
agents always prefer higher x, up to the point that x is no longer binding on high-wealth 
individuals, i.e., x = xH.  Hence, low-wealth agents strictly prefer xH to x İ (xL, xH) as long 
as high-wealth agents participate.
High-wealth agents:  for a high-wealth agent (who does not misreport), when x İ [xL,xH]
expected income is  
ʌ1 (w1–z*(w1)) + ʌ2 (w2–z*(w2)) = ʌ2 (w2 – w1– px)
 Hence,  for x > xL, increasing x will only be profitable for high-wealth individuals if it 
 allows  px to fall (i.e., if it relaxes the CIR).  The CIR in this case is  
 CIR    (4’’) w1 + p ʌ2 [s x + (1–s) (w2– w1+ ȖL)] – (ʌ1 + (1–s) ʌ2) cp > D
where the transaction fee t = (ʌ1 + (1–s) ʌ2) cp because state 2 is always misreported by 
low-wealth agents.  Letting px = k, the change in the CIR from increasing p is 
  (A.5)    (1-s) ʌ2 xL – [ʌ1+ (1–s) ʌ2)] c 47
If expression (A.5) is positive, then a reduction in x (along with an increase in p so that 
px is unchanged) will relax the CIR, which means that the MSRO can reduce px (thereby 
  increasing the high-wealth’s agent’s income) without violating the CIR.  Hence, if (A.5) 
  is positive, then high-wealth agents’ profits will be maximized at x= xL(since profits at x
 =  xL are greater than profits at x = xL+ į, which in turn are greater than profits are x = 
 x H). Conversely, if this derivative is negative, then a high-wealth agent will earn more at 
x = xHthan at x İ (xL, xH).
Together, the above results establish that any agent either prefers x12 = xL or x12 = xH to 
any other possible choice of the penalty x.  The remainder of the proof identifies under 
what circumstances the MSRO sets x12 = xL or, alternatively, x12 = xH.
(a) For s sufficiently close to 0, both kinds of agents will prefer x = xL to x = xH.       
Proof: When the penalty is x, high-wealth agents’ incomes are w2– w1 – px, so that their 
  incomes are higher at x = xLthan at x = xH if xH PM,2 > xL PM,1, or
1
21 22 1 2
()
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J J
D
SS SS J JS S

 
    
LL H L
LL H L
xx
w
xcxs s c
  which is true if 
 (A.6)  12 2 [ ( ) ( 1) ] ( 1) ( ) JJ SSJJ S     H LL H L L cs x s x
  is negative.  As s goes to zero, (A.6) goes to 12 2 [( ) ] ( ) J JS S J JS   H LL H L L cx x , which 
  is negative since we have assumed that condition (6) holds and, hence, that ʌ1c < ʌ2xL.
  Low-wealth agent’s income at x = xL is higher than at x = xH (which induces mis-
 reporting)  if  2 21 M , 1 L 2 M , 221M , 2 L ʌ (w -w -p x ) > ʌ [(1-p )(w -w )-p ) J , or simply PM,2> PM,1.
  If this inequality is met, then since xH > xL, all agents will prefer x = xL.  PM,2 - PM,1
takes the sign of  (1 ) ( ) J J   H L sc s , which is positive for s < 1
HL
c
s
c+Ȗ -Ȗ
{ .
 Finally, note that condition (6) implies that all of the relevant constraints can be met 
when the MSRO sets x = xL.  In order for any x and p to constitute an equilibrium, it must 
be that both the CIR and AIR can simultaneously be satisfied.  The highest p that can 
satisfy the high-wealth agent’s AIR in the equilibrium with no misreporting by low-
wealth agents solves  
ʌ1 w1+ ʌ2 [w1 + p xL]=  ʌ1 w1 + ʌ2 w2  or
   p = (w2 - w1)/xL
and this p can satisfy the CIR if  48
  w 1+ ʌ2 p xL - p ʌ1 c – Į > 0, or
21 21
12 1 () () 0 SD S
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  t L
LL
ww ww
wx c
xx
 This last inequality is condition (6).  It follows that an equilibrium exists in which x = xL
 if s < 1
HL
c
s
c+Ȗ -Ȗ
{ .
To complete the proof of statement (a), note that an equilibrium in which x = xH need not 
exist even if one exists when the MSRO sets x = xL.  That is, if high-wealth agents do not 
participate for an x >xL, then setting x greater than xL can have no additional effect on 
expected penalties, and hence x is effectively limited to x = xL.  This situation happens if 
high-wealth agents’ participation constraint is not met at x = xH, i.e., if w2 – w1– PM,2 xH<
0 or
1H 2 1 2 L
1
221H L
(Į-w )x -(w -w )(ʌ x- c )
s < s
ʌ (w -w )(Ȗ -Ȗ +c)
{
Hence, for 12 sm a x { s , s } d , both kinds of agents prefer x = xL.
(b) For s sufficiently close to 1, both kinds of agents will prefer x = xH.
  Proof: A high-wealth agent’s incomes is higher at x =  xH than at x = xL if xH PM,2 < xL
PM, 1, or equivalently, if equation (A.6) is negative.  As s goes to 1, equation (A.6) will
  necessarily be negative.  In addition, since the CIR and AIR-H constraints can be
 satisfied  at  x = xL for all s, it follows that they both can be satisfied at x = xH if equation 
  (A.6) is negative.   
A low-wealth agents’ incomes at x = xH is higher than at x = xL if PM,2< PM,1. Since
xH > xL, it follows that xH PM,2 < xL PM,1, is a sufficient condition for PM,2< PM,1. Hence,
 low-wealth  agents  prefer  x = xH whenever high-wealth agents do.  
(c)    We know that (A.6) must be negative for s sufficiently close to 1, positive for s
  sufficiently close to 0 and continuously differentiable. Hence, there must exist an s,
  which we denotes ˆ, such that (A.6) is equal to zero; i.e.,  
2L H L 1 H L
2L H L
ʌ x( c + Ȗ -Ȗ )-ʌ (Ȗ -Ȗ )c
s=
ʌ x( c + Ȗ -Ȗ )
ˆ .
That is, at s = s ˆ, high-wealth agents earn the same amount whether x = xLord x = xH.
  Their incomes at x = xL are positive, given expression (6).  By continuity, high-wealth 
  agents’ incomes are positive at x = xH for some s <s ˆ, but they earn higher income if  
x = xL.  In contrast, low-wealth agents strictly prefer x = xHat s = s ˆ.  To see this, recall 
  that low-wealth agents prefer x = xH if  () ( 1 ) JJ !  HL s sc.  At s = s ˆ,
1
2
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() ( 1 ) 0
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c
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sx
.  By continuity of low-wealth agent incomes, it 
  follows that for some values of s less thans ˆ, they will prefer x = xH, while high-wealth 
  agents strictly prefer x = xL. ͕49
Lemma 8:     If x12 = xL, then the for-profit SRO chooses 
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  If  x12 =xH, then the for-profit SRO chooses 
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Proof:   Similar to the case when agents are homogeneous, the PSRO sets p to extract surplus 
from agents, and then sets t to extract surplus from customers.  By the same logic as in 
Lemma 3, if the PSRO sets x = xH, then it will choose p to just satisfy the high-wealth 
agents’ AIR, or  
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 and  sets  t to satisfy the CIR , or  1, 2 2 2 1 (( ) ) . FL H L twP ww s SJ J J D     
  If the PSRO sets x = xL, then it sets PF  to just satisfy both types of agents’ AIR, or
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  and the fee t to satisfy the CIR: 12 , 1 21 12 21 () ( ) FL tw Pww w ww SJ D S D         . ͕
Proposition 3: The PSRO either sets x = xL or x = xH.  It sets x = xH when the proportion s of 
high-wealth agents is high (s ˆ<s<1), and sets x = xL otherwise (0<s<s ˆ).
Proof:   Misreporting occurs in equilibrium if x > xL. First note that x will be at least xL.  To see 
this, note that when x < xL, the logic of Lemma 6 holds; it will be profitable to raise x and 
lower p.  That is, the AIC is the same for high and low-wealth agents for x < xL, and can 
be written as  
  z(w2) <  w1 + px.
  Thus, if the PSRO sets p and x in order that equation (8) just binds and x < xL, then only 
 the  product  p times x matters.  Similarly, the customer’s income is  
ʌ2 (w1  + px) + ʌ1w1 – t.
  so that only the product px affects customer income.   50
 Hence,  if  x < xL, and the PSRO increases x and lowers p to keep px fixed (so that the 
  constraints continue to bind), it will not affect SRO income, but it will reduce expected
  enforcement costs.  Thus, it will never be optimal to set x < xL.
  Next we show that x will either be xLor xH.  Consider some x > xL.  Suppose that x and p
  are chosen so that the AIR is met for high-wealth agents (and hence by Lemma 4,
  necessarily is met for low-wealth agents).  Holding xp constant at k, the AIR will be 
  met at all x İ (xL , xH].  As in Lemma 8, for any p and x, the PSRO will set t such that (9)   
  is binding on customers.  The CIR when x > xL is
  CIR    (9a)    [ʌ2 (s px + (1-s) xL) + w1] - t > D
  So that the change in the CIR from increasing p (decreasing x) is  
ʌ2 (1-s) xL
  This represents the amount by which the SRO can increase t as it lowers x and raises p (to 
keep px = k).  If this expression is more than the cost of increasing p (which is [ʌ1+ (1-s) 
ʌ2] c), then the PSRO will increase its profits by lowering x (until x is arbitrarily close to 
xL).  Conversely, if
   (A.5)  ʌ2(1- s)xL - [ʌ1 + (1-s) ʌ2] c
  is negative, then the PSRO profits are higher at x = xH than at any x İ (xL, xH).
  Finally, note that (A.5) < 0 is a necessary condition for the PSRO to choose x = xH  , but
not sufficient.   Profits are higher at x = xH than at x = xL if the increase in the 
transactions fee from avoiding misreporting is less than the increased enforcement costs 
of avoiding misreporting. (Misreporting may either increase or decrease enforcement 
costs.  If misreporting increases enforcement costs, then the for-profit exchange will 
always choose x = xL, so that there is no misreporting.)   The increase in transaction fees 
is less than the enforcement costs saving if 
 t 1 - t2  = ʌ2 PF,1(xL)  - ʌ2 PF,2 [(1-s) xL + s xH)] < ʌ1 c (PF,1 - PF,2)  - ʌ2 c (1-s) PF,2, or
 (A.7)    12 2 [ ( ) ( 1) ] ( 1) ( ) H LL H L L cs x s x J JS S J JS   ! 
  If (A.7) is satisfied, then (A.5) will necessarily be negative. Hence, a necessary and 
  sufficient condition for the PSRO to set  x = xHand allow misreporting is that (A.7) hold, 
 or    s < 
2L H L 1 H L
2L H L
ʌ x( c + Ȗ -Ȗ )-ʌ (Ȗ -Ȗ )c
s=
ʌ x( c + Ȗ -Ȗ )
ˆ . ͕51
Proposition 4:  If conditions are such that the AIR can be satisfied, then P’F> P’M,and P’F>
P’M for Ȗ < D - w1,
Proof:  If ʌ2 (w2 - w1) - ʌ1 c > D - w1 > Ȗ then
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so that P’F> P’M if  22 1 22 1 1 1 1 () [ () ( ) ] ww ww w c c SS D J S J S        > 0, and this is non-
negative whenever conditions are such that the AIR holds.  When ʌ2 (w2 - w1) > Ȗ > D - w1, P’M
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